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The Russian Federation is a key state actor in cyberspace; cyber events associated with 
Russian state and non-state actors have threatened Russia’s neighbors, shaped 
international cyber norms, as well as influenced strategists’ understanding of cyber 
power. This thesis seeks to understand Russian cyber capability through the lens of 
Robert Jervis’s offense-defense theory in order to answer the thesis’s central question: Do 
Russian cyber capabilities reflect an investment in offensive or defensive cyber weapons, 
and do Russia’s cyber technology, doctrine, and policy differentiate its posture as 
offensive or defensive? To evaluate Russian cyber capability, this thesis considers two 
factors—technology and geography—concluding that, although the Russian government 
is modifying its cyber terrain to improve defensiveness, Russia’s brandished cyber 
weapons suggest that it pursues offensive capability. To evaluate Russia’s posture 
differentiation, the thesis examines Russians’ understanding of cyber power, Russian 
information warfare and hybrid warfare doctrines, and the country’s international 
engagements, concluding that, although Russia has historically presented its posture as 
defensive, it is increasingly difficult to make that distinction. Finally, the thesis evaluates 
this state-level analysis in the broader context of the international system; Russia’s 
historical aggression and current behavior in cyberspace likely reflects Stephen van 
Evera’s explanatory hypothesis for the causes of war—defensive expansion.  
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 xiv 
I. ASSESSING CYBER POWER 
The development and proliferation of cyber technologies over the last thirty years 
has added a new dimension to international strategy, creating new threats and 
opportunities for cyberspace-based crime, espionage, and warfare.1 A key actor in the 
cyber domain is the Russian Federation; cyber events associated with Russian state and 
non-state actors have shaped the international environment, created security challenges, 
and influenced strategists’ understanding of cyber power. The relative novelty and rapid 
pace of cyber development, however, have also resulted in gaps in the understanding of 
cyber power as both an instrument of power and an element of national strategy.   
This thesis evaluates the role and posture of the Russian Federation in cyberspace. 
In doing so, the author considers the extensive existing literature of cyber events 
associated with Russia, the scholarly works that have examined Russian information 
warfare doctrine, and the record of Russian engagement through international institutions. 
Though, individually, these subject areas provide a wealth of analysis and policy 
recommendations, the author’s goal is to offer a holistic perspective on Russia’s behavior 
in cyberspace through the lens of existing international relations theory. The value of 
understanding Russia’s actions according to a theoretical framework is that policy makers 
may more effectively engage Russia, focusing not just on immediate crises or initiatives, 
but instead, on crafting a strategic approach that targets underlying causes of behavior. 
A. PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIAN CYBER CAPABILITY 
Assessments of Russia’s cyber power, as articulated by key U.S. officials, 
categorize the Russian Federation as one of the leading powers in cyberspace; this 
suggests that capability parity with the United States presents a potential threat to 
American national security, and that intent demonstrated through conflicts with its 
1 Lucas Kello, “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft,” International 
Security 38, no. 2 (Fall, 2013): 7-40. doi: 1.1162/ISEC_a_00138.  
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neighbors necessitates a continued cyber arms race.2 Congressional reports highlight that 
Russia is a highly capable actor, recognizing that its cyber power can be applied for both 
espionage and attack.3 Open-source U.S. military analysis suggests that Russian cyber 
power is integral to the country’s military strategy for achieving its political international 
objectives and recommends a broad deterrence policy for the United States.4 In addition 
to this primarily offensive conception of Russia’s cyber capability, academic sources 
recognize Russia’s own strategic security concerns in cyberspace, focusing on 
information warfare threats perceived by Russian political elites.5 Collectively, the 
existing body of literature provides excellent insights into specific facets of Russia’s 
cyber capability, but falls short of achieving a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s cyber 
capabilities and linking these capabilities to Russia’s offensive and defensive security 
strategy objectives. 
International and U.S. evaluation of Russian cyber strategy and capabilities is 
mostly based on four sets of Russian-associated cyber activities: the 2007 Estonia Bronze 
Soldier crisis, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, criminal activity associated with the 
Russian Business Network (RBN), and presumed capabilities of Russia’s spy agencies. 
The cyber crisis in Estonia gained international prominence because of the large-scale 
disruption by cyber attacks directed at Estonia’s cyber infrastructure and online services. 
In the aftermath of the month-long crisis, the attacks were attributed to Russian activists, 
2 Keith Alexander, “House Armed Services Subcommittee, Cyberspace Operations Testimony,” The 
Cyber Domain, U.S. Department of Defense, September 23, 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/House%20Armed%20Services%20S
ubcommittee%20Cyberspace%20Operations%20Testimony%2020100923.pdf. 
3 “Cyber Threats from China, Russia, and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure,” 
Committee on Homeland Security, 113th Congress (March 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113hhrg82583/html/CHRG-113hhrg82583.htm. 
4 Richard G. Zoller, “Russian Cyberspace Strategy and a Proposed United States Response,” Strategy 
Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2010, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA522027. 
5 Stephen Blank, “Threats to and from Russia: An Assessment,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 
21, no. 3 (2008): 491–526. doi:10.1080/13518040802313746. 
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but not to the government.6 Similarly, despite compelling circumstantial evidence, cyber 
attacks concurrent with Russia’s official military campaign against Georgia in August 
2008 were conclusively linked solely to Russian activists and criminal organizations.7 
Both of the cyber events seemed to align with Russian government interests and 
suggested a permissive environment for non-state cyber actors.8 Additionally, the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict that began in 2014 offers an on-going demonstration of 
Russia’s current cyber capabilities and tactics. 
Whereas the cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia occurred within well-defined 
operational windows, criminal cyber activity linked to Russia has spanned the last decade 
and is exemplified by the RBN. Malicious activities associated with Russian criminal 
organizations represent significant cyber capacity; Russia’s criminals possess moderately 
sophisticated technology, but control vast online resources.9 Additionally, most sources 
that assess Russia’s cyber capability share an assumption that is inherently difficult to 
substantiate: Russia’s intelligence and security agencies charged with cyber missions—
Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the military’s 
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)—possess cyber exploitation ability on par with 
leading powers.10 
6 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, 
(Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, 2010); Rain Ottis, “Analysis of the 2007 Cyber 
Attacks Against Estonia from the Information Warfare Perspective,” presented at the 7th European 
Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Plymouth. (Reading: Academic Publishing Limited, 
2008), 163-8. 
7 “Russia/Georgia Cyber War – Findings and Analysis,” Project Grey Goose: Phase I Report, last 
modified October 17, 2008, 9, http://blog.refractal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/10/2i7t2qyiwv0g63e7l3g.pdf; “Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign 
Against Georgia in August of 2008,” U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit (2009), http://www.registan.net/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf; Carolina Vendil Pallin, and 
Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences," Small Wars & Insurgencies 
20, no. 2 (2009): 400-24. doi: 10.1080/09592310902975539 
8 Scott J. Shackelford, “State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing 
Problem,” presented at the Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings 2010, (Tallinn, Estonia: CCD COE 
Publications, 2010): 197-208; Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the 
Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27, no. 1 (2014): 107-8, 
doi:10.1080/13518046.2014.874845. 
9 Alexander Klimburg, “Mobilizing Cyber Power,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no. 1 
(2011): 41-60. doi: 10.1080/00396338.2011.555595. 
10 “Cyber Threats From China, Russia, and Iran.” 
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 The limitations of analysis based on these events are that they typically solely 
represent the cyber power of Russia’s non-state actors, demonstrate only a portion of the 
broader spectrum of cyber capabilities, and focus exclusively on offensive capability. 
Despite these shortcomings, cyber events associated with Russia have stimulated the 
development of international norms and laws and have shaped defensive strategies of 
states that perceive themselves vulnerable to similar attacks.  
In contrast to this offense-focused analysis, Russian and select international 
analysts seek to understand the information warfare ramifications of cyber power. 
Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes an information-psychological aspect of cyber 
confrontation, and the Russian government believes that it is already engaged in a 
defensive action in a global information war.11 This perception is shaped by the role of 
social media and what Russia perceives as hostile propaganda during the Color 
Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and recently in its own domestic politics.12 In response to 
this perceived security concern, Russia has continuously advocated for international 
treaty restrictions on cyber warfare.13 Domestically, it has structured its information 
warfare doctrine to address this threat, and has regulated its information technology 
sector to increase resilience to hostile information operations, propaganda, and political 
dissent.14 While American and other international experts categorize Russia as an 
11 “Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the 
Information Space,” Unofficial NATO Translation, accessed March 24, 2014 (Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Centre of Excellence): 3, 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/strategies/Russian_Federation_unofficial_translation.pdf. 
12 Keir Giles, “‘Information Troops’ – a Russian Cyber Command?,” presented at the 3rd International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (2011): 45-57, 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2011proceedings/InformationTroopsARussianCyberCommand-
Giles.pdf. 
13 Keir Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues,” presented at the 4th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (2012): 63-74, 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/2_1_Giles_RussiasPublicStanceOnCyberInformation
Warfare.pdf; “Convention on International Information Security,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, last modified September 22, 2011, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/7b17ead7244e2064c3257925003bcbcc!OpenDocument. 
14 Stephen Blank, “Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” American Foreign 
Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 35, no. 1 (January 
2013): 31–44. doi:10.1080/10803920.2013.757946. 
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aggressor based on the actions of Russian non-state actors, overt Russian state efforts and 
cyber developments appear to be more defensive.15  
B. OFFENSE-DEFENSE THEORY 
The international relations theoretic paradigm for analyzing Russian cyber 
capability that the author adopts throughout this thesis is Robert Jervis's offense-defense 
theory. The following sections describe the theory's fundamental explanatory argument, 
recapitulate critiques of the theory, and argue why this analytic paradigm is suitable for 
studying Russian cyber power. 
1. Idealized Definition  
In his 1978 study of problems in international politics, “Cooperation Under the 
Security Dilemma,” Robert Jervis identifies the security dilemma as a problematic 
process that escalates international tension—security-seeking states appear to increase the 
insecurity of other states simply through defensive actions that should otherwise be 
nonthreatening. The intensity of this security dilemma, or whether or not the international 
systems manifests it in the first place, depends on two variables—“whether defensive 
weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and whether the defense 
or the offense has the advantage.”16 Jervis further elaborates on factors that underlie 
these variables and under what conditions they affect the security dilemma.  
The first variable, offense-defense differentiation, addresses states’ perceptions of 
others—whether other states threaten them or not. States base these perceptions on 
whether other states’ armaments can be used strictly for offense or defense (or both), and 
on the military and political strategies states pursue.17 If it is possible to differentiate 
states’ postures, then security-seeking states can cooperate with likeminded states, but 
revisionist states may still act aggressively. Such a situation, however, is stable—the 
15 Oleg Demidov, “Cyberwarfare and Russian Style of Cyberdefense,” Security Index: A Russian 
Journal on International Security 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 70–71, doi:10.1080/19934270.2013.814955. 
16 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 
186-7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958. 
17 Ibid., 203. 
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transparency of intentions precludes the security dilemma and aggressive states signal 
hostile behavior. The second variable, the offense-defense balance, strives to ascertain 
whether weapons favor the attacker or the defender. At times when it is possible to 
differentiate whether offensive or defensive weapons dominate, Jervis predicts various 
security dilemma outcomes: if dollar-for-dollar offensive weapons are a better 
investment, states are more inclined to attack first; but when defensive weapons 
dominate, wars tend toward stalemates and status-quo powers prefer to cooperate.18 
According to Jervis, two factors determine this balance: military technology and 
geography.19  
Based on the possible combinations of these two variables, Jervis proposes a 
“Four Worlds” model, according to which one can generalize the stability of the 
international system (see Figure 1).20 This model depicts the world from the perspective 
of a status-quo power—an unstable world is a dangerous world, but revisionist states 
might instead see it as a world of opportunity. Although this idealized model eloquently 
distills international anarchy into four quadrants, Jervis explains that reality conforms to a 
continuum of possible magnitudes of the variables. Although reality is more nuanced 
than Jervis’s basic model, the Four Worlds model nonetheless provides a succinct and 
coherent realist perspective for evaluating the conditions of the international system. 
18 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 188. 
19 Ibid., 194. 
20 Ibid., 211. 
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 Figure 1.  International Stability Outcomes Based on Jervis’s Offense-Defense 
Theory.21 
2. Critiques and Theoretical Variations 
Since its publication over thirty-five years ago, Jervis’s offense-defense theory 
has withstood critiques from some scholars, while other scholars have enriched its 
analytic, descriptive, and predictive depth. Sean M. Lynn-Jones summarizes the main 
criticisms of offense-defense theory and the corresponding rebuttals. Jervis’s theory 
shares the underlying assumptions of realist international theory: a state of anarchy 
envelops the international system, states are self-reliant for security, and, although states 
may make mistakes, they act out of rational self-interest.22 These fundamental 
assumptions and how they govern neorealist and neoliberal theory remain the subject of 
contemporary debate.23 
In addition to these general criticisms, Lynn-Jones lists five specific objections. 
The first objection is that it is impossible to distinguish weapons as offensive or 
21 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 211. 
22 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 
1995): 664-5. doi:10.1080/09636419509347600. 
23 Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate 
Neorealism and its Critics. by Robert O. Keohane; Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate. by David A. Baldwin,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 331-44, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706934. 
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defensive.24 Although this concern recognizes that most weapons systems contain 
offensive and defensive qualities, it overstates the resulting problem; despite the dual use 
of weapons, in practice, states still typically recognize which types of weapons are more 
cost advantageous for offensive operations, and which for defensive.25 The second 
objection is that states fail to correctly perceive the offense-defense balance.26 This 
concern, however, does not invalidate the theory—factors that cause states to incorrectly 
assess the situation are unit-level variables, and even if states miscalculate, offense-
defense theory acknowledges that states base their actions on their individual perceptions, 
and not on universal objectivity.27 Another critique suggests that Jervis misinterpreted 
the causal direction of international conflict—states create offensive and defensive 
advantages according to their strategic goals.28 Though this criticism may have merit, 
concedes Lynn-Jones, it oversimplifies reality. In only rare cases does a single state shape 
the direction of military development to create its own singular advantage; even when a 
state obtains unique military technology, the diffusion of knowledge allows other states 
to emulate and achieve parity.29 
Another set of criticisms contends that other variables and processes have a more 
dominant role in governing international conflict. Some claim that the offense-defense 
balance always favors defense—it is therefore a constant factor, not a variable one.30 
This criticism fails to recognize that the offense-defense balance is a continuum, with the 
relative advantage shrinking or growing at different historical periods, affording states the 
opportunity to concentrate resources to overcome the relative advantage of defensive 
weapons at that moment.31 More importantly, even if the balance objectively favors 
defense at a given point in time, as famously illustrated by the offense-defense theory 
24 Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” 672-3. 
25 Ibid., 674-7. 
26 Ibid., 677-9. 
27 Ibid., 679-82. 
28 Ibid., 689. 
29 Ibid., 690. 
30 Ibid., 688. 
31 Ibid., 688-9.  
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analysis of World War I, states may still misinterpret the balance.32 Another line of 
critique emphasizes the role of political intentions, distributions of power, and domestic 
dynamics as the driving forces of international instability.33 The answer to these 
challenges, according to Lynn-Jones, is that these may be valid complementary 
explanations—such factors may bias states to act as either status-quo or revisionist actors, 
but the outcome of their foreign policy choices set by state-level dynamics will develop 
according to the international-level offense-defense balance.34 In summary, although 
scholars have challenged Jervis, his work has withstood these criticisms, especially 
thanks to one of offense-defense theory’s most powerful qualities—it incorporates 
subjectivity and uncertainty.  
Subsequent scholarly work on offense-defense theory has strived to elucidate the 
challenges of subjectivity and uncertainty, allowing for greater accuracy and precision in 
measuring Jervis’s critical variables. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann offer 
approaches for measuring the offense-defense balance. They propose a simple formula: a 
cost ratio of the forces an attacker must use to capture territory versus the cost of 
defensive forces to hold that territory. Based on this computation, “all else being equal, 
the larger this quotient, the greater the attacker’s prospects for success.”35 They further 
nuance the offense-defense balance calculation as dependent on war objectives—modest 
territorial goals may be more tempting for aggressive states.36 Glaser and Kaufman make 
another important observation: because of the complexity of contributing factors, it may 
be more meaningful to calculate dyadic, rather than systemic offense-defense balance, 
and it is valuable to consider the directional balance of a given dyad.37 Because of this 
added measuring complexity, unlike Jervis’s generalized offense-defense model that 
depends on technology and geography, Glaser and Kaufmann’s measurement 
32 Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” 689. 
33 Ibid., 683. 
34 Ibid., 686-7. 
35 Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We 
Measure It?,” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 51, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539240. 
36 Ibid., 53. 
37 Ibid., 57-9. 
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methodology also includes force size, nationalism, and cumulatively of resources, but 
excludes first-move advantage and alliance behavior. Despite these modifications, the 
authors conclude that ballpark estimates provide sufficient insight to accurately satisfy 
the offense-defense model.38 Karen Ruth Adams’s work confirms this conclusion. Her 
empirical study of armed conflict among great powers from 1800 to 1997 shows the 
statistical significance of what she describes as the offense-defense-deterrence balance: 
attacks on other states are less frequent and less successful in defense- and deterrence-
dominant eras.39 
Lastly, Stephen van Evera makes an important contribution to offense-defense 
theory by describing the mechanisms which may explain aggression in an offense-
dominant world and evaluating these mechanisms’ roles in historical conflicts. Like 
Adams, he finds that conflicts occurred as the theory predicts: in the last two centuries of 
European wars, conflicts occurred due to perceptions of offense dominance, the decline 
of international order throughout medieval China correlated with a shift toward offense 
dominance, and America’s geographic security seems to have contributed to the United 
States’ lower aggression.40 Upon validating offense-defense theory’s analytic power and 
analyzing in greater depth the mechanisms that influence aggression, van Evera also 
argues that the theory is especially valuable because of its wide real-world 
applicability.41 
3. Applicability to Cyberspace 
Due to its explanatory power and theoretical prominence alone, offense-defense 
theory is a worthy lens for evaluating the effect of cyber power on the international 
system. Many of the popular and scholarly discussions about cyber power often use 
offense-defense terminology without explicitly contextualizing it as such—commentators 
38 Glaser and Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance, ” 78-9. 
39 Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-
Deterrence Balance,” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/2004): 79-81, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137477. 
40 Stephen van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 4 
(Spring 1998): 36-9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3539239. 
41 Ibid., 41. 
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refer to offense dominance, arms races, and power balance diffusion. These and other 
assertions about cyber power would benefit from analysis within an overarching 
theoretical framework.42 As Dr. Wade L. Huntley suggests, a more systematic analysis of 
cyber power is necessary to validate what may be assumptions or false analogies about 
the relevance of cyber power in shaping the international system.43 
Some scholars have begun to undertake this effort. Ilai Saltzman’s 2013 article, 
“Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance,” reflects on the role of cyber power 
at the international level with an examination of activities by the United States, China, 
Russia, and NATO. His analysis shows that although it is necessary to modify some 
terminology to accommodate the nature of cyber weapons, an offense-defense theory 
analysis of cyber power yields insight into its distinct contributions to the overall balance 
of military power.44 Whereas Saltzman considered the cyber offense-defense balance 
among three great powers, Patrick Malone proposes a model for calculating offense-
defense cost ratios for various cyber attacks, showing that we can gain empirical insight 
into the balance of cyber weapons.45 Both approaches show that a practical application of 
offense-defense theory to cyber power is meaningful and valuable. 
The offense-defense theory approach to cyber power is not without its critics as 
well. Keir Lieber argues that in addition to offense-defense theory’s conventional 
explanatory challenges, its utility in assessing cyber power is even more suspect because 
of cyber weapons’ dubious effectiveness in achieving political ends.46 Cyber weapons’ 
secrecy, he argues, makes an arms race unlikely—states cannot respond to a secret 
weapons buildup.47 According to his critique, although by analogy cyber weapons appear 
42 Wade L. Huntley, “Offense, Defense, and Cyber War” presented at the International Studies 
Association, Toronto, Canada (March 2014): 10. 
43 Ibid., 22-3. 
44 Ilai Saltzman, “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance,” Contemporary Security Policy 
34, no. 1 (2013): 40-63. doi: 10.1080/1352360/2013/771031. 
45 Patrick J. Malone, “Offense-Defense Balance in Cyberspace: A Proposed Model” (Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27863. 
46 Keir Lieber, “ The Offense-Defense Balance and Cyber Warfare,” in Cyber Analogies. ed. Emily O. 
Goldman and John Arquilla (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014): 103, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40037. 
47 Ibid., 104.  
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to have offensive dominance, the qualitative nature of cyber power does not contribute to 
the security dilemma in the same fashion as conventional arms. 
This thesis, however, assumes that offense-defense theory has sufficient 
explanatory capacity to incorporate cyber power as a facet of the overall balance of 
power among states. Furthermore, the theory’s flexibility in incorporating secrecy, 
intentions, and ambiguity may be exactly the mechanisms strategists need to articulate 
the strategic effect of some of cyber weapons’ problematic properties—attribution, 
secrecy, and perishability. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The role and nature of cyberspace in international relations (IR) is a subject of 
ongoing debate among policy makers, military planners, and subject matter experts. 
Although this theoretical debate is still inconclusive, this thesis forgoes the debate and 
assumes that defensive realism’s concept of security dilemma applies to cyberspace. The 
value of this approach is that it provides a cyber power analysis that follows an existing 
IR paradigm and combines multiple facets of cyberspace development into a strategic 
assessment. Also, because the security dilemma applies to the international system, this 
approach affords an opportunity to compare and contrast Russia’s behavior with expected 
state behavior. 
Additionally, the quality and relevance of this thesis in assessing Russian cyber 
posture offers insight into the merits of offense-defense theory and validates the 
underlying assumption that existing IR concepts, specifically offense-defense balance, 
apply to cyberspace. This thesis is a practical application of IR concepts to cyber power. 
The quality of the author’s efforts notwithstanding, this application of theory to an 
existing problem set may help gauge the applicability and relevance of offense-defense 
theory to cyberspace and help facilitate the theoretical debate about the nature of cyber 
power.  
Robert Jervis defines two variables responsible for shaping the security dilemma: 
“whether defensive weapons and policies can be differentiated from offensive ones” and 
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“whether the offense or the defense has the advantage.”48 Jervis conceived this formula 
for an international level of analysis, but for clarity and applicability at the state level of 
analysis, the author adopts a modified definition. In this thesis, the author modifies the 
first variable, offense-defense differentiation, as Russia’s cyber posture differentiation: 
can Russia’s intentions be differentiated as either favoring offensive or defensive action? 
If a system level of analysis reveals that weapons and policies can be differentiated, then 
it is doubtful that a state-level analysis that merely narrows the scope of the question to 
that state’s capability will provide additional insight—a state cannot change the 
fundamental property of weapons. Instead, at the state level it is more valuable to 
consider a state’s posture and intentions. This differentiation among states, Jervis 
suggests, is beneficial for identifying status-quo and aggressor states, facilitating 
cooperation, or providing advanced warning.49 By studying Russia’s posture and 
intentions, one may be able to infer its role in the international system—whether it is 
exacerbating or abating the security dilemma. 
The author also redefines Jervis’s second variable, offense-defense advantage, as 
Russia’s cyber force composition: does Russia invest in offensive or defensive 
capability? This definition results from extending Jervis’s reasoning to the state level. At 
the international level of analysis, a world where offense dominates suggests that dollar 
for dollar, a state would rationally invest in offensive capability.50 A state-level 
consequence of an offense-dominated world would be an international system in which 
states are armed with predominantly offensive weapons. To perform the same analysis 
bottom-up, at the state level, one would examine what category of weapons a state has 
chosen to invest in—offensive or defensive. The existing body of literature serves as the 
basis of Russia-related cyber weapons use. A consolidated analysis of this brandished, 
employed, and implied Russian cyber capability allows subsequent comparison of Russia 
against the international level, offering insight as to whether Russia is a status quo or a 
revisionist state. The same assessment of Russian capability may also serve as basis for 
48 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 186-7. 
49 Ibid,. 199-200. 
50 Ibid., 188. 
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dyadic comparison, perhaps forecasting if an arms race between Russia and a specific 
state is likely.  
Based on these modified variables, this thesis makes the following four mutually 
exclusive hypotheses, according to Jervis’s Four Worlds model:51  
H1. Russia’s cyber capability is offensive and the posture is indistinguishable as 
either offensive or defensive. 
H2. Russia’s cyber capability is defensive and the posture is indistinguishable as 
either offensive or defensive. 
H3. Russia’s cyber capability is offensive and the posture is distinguishable as 
either offensive or defensive. 
H4. Russia’s cyber capability is defensive and the posture is distinguishable as 
either offensive or defensive. 
Another outcome of the research—the failure to produce substantive analysis—is 
possible: 
H5. The unique properties of cyberspace preclude meaningful offense-defense 
theory analysis. 
Although this hypothesis would fail to provide insight into Russia’s cyber capability, this 
failure may nonetheless provide useful insight about cyber power—if neither the analysis, 
evidence, nor method are faulty, then perhaps cyber power introduces unique challenges 
and factors that confound existing theoretical understanding of the security dilemma. 
In addition to altering Jervis’s variables to permit a state-level analysis, this thesis 
also proposes a different definition of geography. “Technology and geography,” 
according to Jervis, “are the two main factors that determine whether the offense or the 
defense has the advantage.”52 Unlike technology, evaluating geography in cyberspace is 
inherently problematic—most definitions of cyberspace not only consider it a manmade 
domain, but also a virtual domain. This thesis adopts the Department of Defense’s 
51 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 211-4.  
52 Ibid., 194. 
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definition of cyberspace: it is a global domain within the information environment that 
consists of three layers—physical, logical, and cyber persona.53 Only the physical 
network layer has a geographic component, but the other layers also have their own 
relational topologies among and within other layers that may be more relevant to the 
efficacy of offense and defense than the topography of physical nodes and links that 
enable operations in cyberspace. Future technological developments in information 
technology will likely make it even more difficult to conceive of cyber geography. One 
such development, cloud computing, will further abstract cyberspace apart from physical 
geography by creating a distributed, dynamic, and ubiquitous resource pool for scalable, 
on-demand computing.54 This evolution of computing will increasingly obfuscate the 
relationship between the physical, logical, and persona layers of cyberspace, necessitating 
a broad definition. 
Because cyber geography is so different from physical geography, one may 
choose to modify Jervis’s theory as applied to cyberspace by discarding geography as an 
analytic factor, or it may be possible to consider a metaphor for geography in 
cyberspace.55 This thesis adopts the notion of a cyber geography that considers all three 
layers of cyberspace as cyber terrain, with differentiable security boundaries, mobility 
factors, attribution, and perishability. Thus, cyber terrain may be mapped out with 
metaphorical mobility corridors, high ground, key objectives, and barriers at the tactical 
and strategic levels. For the purpose of offense-defense analysis, however, only the 
strategic view of cyber terrain is useful. That is, this thesis’s analysis only concerns with 
attributes of cyberspace within the jurisdiction of a state that are differentiable from 
cyberspace within the jurisdiction of other states. A trivial illustration of such 
differentiation is the unique Internet Protocol address scheme assigned to states by the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers that maps national sovereignty to 
53 Joint Publication 3-12, “Cyberspace Operations,” (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), v, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. 
54 Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, “NIST Special Publication 800-145: The NIST Definition of Cloud 
Computing,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce (2011): 2-3, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
55 Huntley, “Offense, Defense, and Cyber War,” 16-7. 
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cyber coordinates. A more sophisticated international-level example of cyber terrain may 
be a state-managed firewall that regulates Internet traffic exchanged between its cyber 
resources and other states’ cyber resources. An encryption protocol used by a sizable 
portion of Internet users across the world may be an example of a distinctive cyber 
mobility corridor that affects international cyber power. Just based on these three 
examples, it is apparent that an innumerable multitude of technical implementations may 
shape cyber geography, but the subjective task of this thesis is to identify cyber terrain 
features that both differentiate the totality of Russian cyberspace from the global 
cyberspace and influence whether offense or defense has the advantage. 
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II. RUSSIAN CYBER CAPABILITY 
This chapter seeks to determine whether Russian cyber capability favors offense 
or defense. Following Robert Jervis’ offense-defense theory formulation, this analysis 
considers two factors: cyber technology and cyber geography.56  
First, this analysis of cyber technology is broader than strictly an evaluation of the 
Russian military’s cyber capabilities—the militaries of states are latecomers to an 
international system that perhaps resembles the anarchic pre-Westphalian dispersal of 
power. The current state of cyber power, as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. argues, predisposes a 
diffusion of power within the cyber domain; non-state actors have very low barriers for 
obtaining and using offensive weapons.57 The Russian government, therefore, may not 
strictly monopolize Russian cyber power, but may rely on other sources of domestic 
cyber power, exercising varying degrees of control over its proxies' methods, objectives, 
and actions. The author's underlying assumption throughout this thesis, therefore, is that 
as long as cyber power is exercised in a manner that supports the Russian Federation’s 
objectives, it is unimportant whether the actors are uniformed military, security agents, 
mercenaries, coerced businesses, or other proxies. After all, other states, according to 
offense-defense theory logic, react based on their subjective, inherently pessimistic 
perceptions of these Russian-associated applications of cyber power. Furthermore, recent 
demonstrations of Russia’s hybrid warfare military strategy in Ukraine illustrate the link 
between state and proxy actors, providing a practical validation to suspicions of surrogate 
actors. Therefore, when considering technology, this paper takes a broad view of the 
types of offensive cyber operations and the actors that undertake them that constitute 
Russia’s cyber capability. 
Second, this chapter places an emphasis on analyzing Russia’s cyber geography 
(as defined in the introduction); since cyberspace is a manmade domain its geography is 
malleable. How Russia shapes its cyber terrain may as telling of its offensive or defensive 
56 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 194.  
57 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Cyber Power,” Harvard Kennedy School, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2010), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf. 
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capability as is its technological capability. Robert Jervis describes various manmade 
barriers as imitations of geographic obstacles and this logic has a very pronounced effect 
in cyberspace.58 Despite the often-touted ubiquity of the Internet, the topology of long-
haul communications links, access aggregation by Internet service providers, and 
country-specific IP space allocation schemes provide states with a technical means to 
circumscribe their national cyberspace. The People’s Republic of China’s notorious Great 
Firewall of China, for example, controls ingress and egress to Chinese cyberspace 
according to both, traffic origin and destination, and traffic content.59 Additionally, 
various communications standards within a segment of cyberspace, such as encryption 
layers or authentication protocols, can affect user and data attribution. A state’s choices 
in developing its cyber geography, much like its decisions to invest in minefields, 
demilitarized buffer zones, or off-gauge railroad tracks, affect its offensive or defensive 
capability. 
A. CASE STUDIES 
Following a broad definition of technological capability, this section examines a 
variety of cyber events perpetrated by or attributed to Russian actors and argues that 
although secrecy, according to Martin Libicki, constrains a state’s ability to brandish 
cyber weapons, these attacks nonetheless suggest a pattern of state sponsorship and 
therefore exemplify Russian cyber capability.60 The first section of this chapter evaluates 
the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, the cyber campaign that paralleled the 2008 Russo-
Georgian War, and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Additionally, this case study analysis 
considers the technological capacity of Russian cyber criminals and intelligence services. 
58 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 195. 
59 Ben Elgin and Bruce Einhorn, “The Great Firewall of China,” Bloomberg Business, January 22, 
2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2006-01-22/the-great-firewall-of-china. 
60 Martin C. Libicki, “Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities,” RAND National Defense Institute, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf. 
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1. 2007 Estonia Cyber Attacks 
In April 2007, nationalist tensions between Estonians and the ethnic Russian 
minority in Tallinn, Estonia culminated in what many observers and commentators have 
since considered a historic cyber event. These nationalist tensions initially centered on a 
World War II memorial honoring Soviet troops—to Estonians the memorial represented a 
vestige of Soviet occupation, whereas to the Russian minority it commemorated the 
sacrifice and heroism of the Great Patriotic War. Frustrated with their perceived 
marginalization in Estonian society, local Russians embraced the statue as a symbol of 
their plight. Throughout the spring of 2007, the situation in Tallinn deteriorated; displays 
of Russian nationalist pride at the Bronze Soldier memorial escalated into provocations, 
hooliganism, and eventually led to street violence and riots. Pro-Russian cyber attackers 
conducted a three-week campaign attacking Estonia’s cyber infrastructure concurrently 
with the physical riots in Estonia.61   
The technical characterization of the cyber attacks varied from low to moderate 
levels of sophistication. The first wave of attacks used basic Denial of Service (DoS) 
tactics and showed little coordination and target selection. NATO’s Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Center of Excellence synopsis of the attacks in International Cyber Incidents: 
Legal Considerations bluntly describes the initial attacks as “simple, ineptly coordinated, 
and easily mitigated.”62 In contrast, the attacks that followed beginning on April 30 used 
more sophisticated Distributed DoS (DDoS) tools and demonstrated centralized 
command and control that effectively shifted among targets and concentrated attacker 
firepower. Throughout the initial DoS and the later DDoS phase of the cyber campaign, 
pro-Russian attackers also conducted website defacements and spamming, phishing, and 
personal harassment of Estonian victims.63 
The variety of cyber attacks resulted in a corresponding variety of effects. Many 
of the low sophistication attacks were little more than a nuisance to their targets and to 
61 Ottis, “Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks,”163. 
62 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, 19. 
63 Ibid., 23. 
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Estonia’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).64 The DDoS attacks on the 
media and financial organizations, however, resulted in a disruption of online financial 
services and strategic communication isolation from the rest of the world.65 Despite 
accomplishing these technical effects, it is unclear that the campaign achieved a strategic 
objective.  
One potential strategic objective may have been to compel the Estonian 
government to reverse its decision to return the Bronze Soldier statue to its previous 
place, which it did not do. If the attackers’ objective was instead to cause economic harm 
to Estonia, this effect is difficult to measure outright—the losses from the disruptions had 
a notable effect on Estonia economy, but no businesses declared or claimed financial 
loses.66 Although the net effect of the attacks may be difficult to ascertain, the attacks 
nonetheless offer an opportunity to calculate the relative cost ratio of the offensive and 
defensive actions, in order to better determine whether offensive or defensive weapons 
dominate. In his proposed model for calculating the offense-defense cost ratio in 
cyberspace, Patrick Malone estimates that for every dollar expended by attackers, 
Estonian defenders spent $424.67 This degree of cost disparity suggests that cyber attacks 
such as the one against Estonia, despite dubious strategic effectiveness, may entice 
Russia and other states to act aggressively.  
Although the cyber attacks against Estonia have not been attributed to the Russian 
government, circumstantially, they reflected Russian state interests. As the Bronze 
Soldier crisis developed within Estonia, the Russian Federation signaled its stake in a 
pro-Russian resolution of Estonia’s domestic conflict. Prior to the eruption of violence, 
the Russian foreign ministry expressed Russia’s position by issuing a protest about the 
Estonian government’s plan to relocate the Bronze Soldier Memorial to a less prominent 
location. Once physical violence and cyber attacks commenced, the Russian Federation 
Council advocated freezing diplomatic ties with Estonia and wanted to impose economic 
64 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, 21. 
65 Ibid., 20, 22, 25. 
66 Ibid., 22, 25. 
67 Malone, “Offense-Defense Balance in Cyberspace, ” 53. 
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sanctions. Within the Russian Federation, police failed to protect the Estonian embassy 
when Russian youth groups physically attacked the compound and Estonian staff. An 
unofficial blockade disrupted trade on the Russian-Estonian border. Russian involvement 
in the conflict eventually prompted German Chancellor Angela Merkel to engage Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, discouraging official and unofficial Russian involvement.68 
This level of political commitment to the event on part of the Russian state, as well as the 
use of various soft instruments of power to coerce the Estonian government, are 
suggestive of a scenario in which Russia and other states may employ non-attributable 
cyber weapons to attempt to coerce, punish, or at least disorient another state.  
The cyber attacks against Estonia serve as a valuable illustration within the 
context of offense-defense theory. Once the attacks reached moderate technical 
sophistication and coordination, they had a detrimental effect that the defenders struggled 
to counter. Perhaps more importantly, the attacks also adversely affected the Estonian 
government’s ability to provide public services, disrupted civil society, and complicated 
the government’s response to the underlying ethnic conflict. The attacks had another 
notable characteristic; the disruptions caused by the attacks lasted only as long as the 
attacks themselves. Unlike physical weapons, the cyber weapons used in this conflict 
resulted in little tangible or lasting damage; the attacks temporarily denied access to 
cyber resources, but did not destroy physical property or data. Though tactically 
successful, the attacks did not lead to a pro-Russian outcome; the Estonian government 
did not reverse its decision to move the Bronze Soldier statue to its new location. 
Although these attacks demonstrated that offense had the advantage at a tactical level, 
aggressive action, even when successful, resulted in limited pay-off.  
The attacks also illustrated the importance of cyber geography. As an early and 
enthusiastic implementer of online commerce and civil society, Estonia was an inviting 
target for cyber attacks. After the incident, Estonia’s cyber dependency became a 
cautionary example to the international community and hastened many states’ efforts to 
68 Mathias Roth, Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia, CEPS Working 
Document (Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2009): 13-5, 
http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/2009/09/1900.pdf. 
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implement security countermeasures, especially in critical infrastructure. The attacks also 
demonstrated the discontinuity between physical and cyber borders; potential avenues of 
attack in cyberspace may be innumerable. The DDoS attacks against Estonia harnessed 
cyber resources from across the globe—to effectively defend against such attacks, 
defensive countermeasures needed to be not merely a national, but an international 
endeavor.69 
2. 2008 Russo–Georgian War 
The 2008 Russo–Georgian War was an important milestone in the use of cyber 
power; cyber attacks contributed to, and in several instances complemented, Russia’s 
military campaign in an unprecedented fashion.70 The interstate conflict was a 
continuation of nationalist ambitions of two Georgian regions, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. After a brief independence struggle subsequent to the dissolution of the USSR, 
these regions enjoyed de facto autonomy. Since then, joint Georgian and Russian 
peacekeeping forces maintained stability in South Ossetia. In August of 2008, however, 
after a series of cross-demilitarized zone provocations, the Georgian army invaded South 
Ossetia, capturing its capital. Russian forces that were regionally prepositioned thanks to 
exercises earlier that summer counterattacked, and within five days forced a cease-fire. 
Throughout the brief military engagement, a formally unacknowledged cyber campaign 
showed “Moscow’s readiness to use asymmetric, as well as conventional means to 
achieve its goals.”71 
The cyber weapons and tactics employed against Georgia during the Russo-
Georgian War were similar to, but more sophisticated than those used against Estonia in 
2007. Botnet-perpetrated distributed denials of service attacks, along with targeted 
website defacements, comprised the mainstay of the offensive cyber weapons. Though 
the use of botnets to conduct DDoS attacks is increasingly a less sophisticated 
69 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, 17-8, 25. 
70 David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal. January 6, (2011): 2, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf. 
71 “Russia’s Rapid Reaction,” Strategic Comments 14, no. 7 (2008): 1. doi: 
10.1080/13567880802482243. 
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endeavor—a black market exists for botnets for hire—the way DDoS attacks were 
conducted against Georgia showed an uncharacteristic level of sophistication. On July 19, 
a potential rehearsal attack using a thereto unknown botnet targeted the Georgian 
President’s website—an attack profile atypical of common cybercrime.72 Throughout the 
cyber campaign, attackers showed a high degree of command and control; they 
conducted training for participants, prioritized targets, distributed tools, and de-conflicted 
and synchronized attacks.73 Unlike in Estonia, however, pro-Georgian actors retaliated 
with similar, but lower volume cyber attacks.74 Overall, though the cyber attacks against 
Georgia showed higher sophistication than those used against Estonia, the technological 
sophistication of the tactics and tools was nonetheless at a low or moderate level. 
The Russian Federation attained its limited strategic goals during the Russo-
Georgian War, but it is unclear whether cyber attacks effectively contributed to Russia’s 
strategic ends. As in Estonia, the attacks had the ephemeral effect of disrupting target 
government, media, and financial websites.75 Efforts to digitally isolate Georgia led some 
analysts to compare the strategic effect to a cyber blockade, but in practice such a 
blockade only affected few—less than 10% of Georgians had access to the Internet, much 
less relied on it for government services and strategic communication.76 Additionally, 
with international support, Georgians reacted rapidly to relocate their effected cyber 
resources to third-party states, overcoming Russian efforts to isolate them.77 Following 
the war, influential Russian analysts like Igor Panarin assessed that, despite the disruption 
72 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Rünnimeri, Mari Kert, Anna-Maria Talihärm, and Liis Vihul, 
Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified, (Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence, 2008), accessed March 25, 2014, 46, 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Georgia%201%200.pdf. 
73 Ibid., 9, 38. 
74 Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study,” 2.  
75 Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, 37-8. 
76 Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, 11; Hollis, “Cyberwar,” 5; Tikk, International Cyber 
Incidents, 68. 
77 Paul A. Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War Between Russia and Georgia,” 
in The Guns of August 2008: Russia War in Georgia, edited by Svantee E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 191. 
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of Georgian strategic communication with cyber attacks, Russia lost the broader 
information campaign during the Russo-Georgian War.78  
Although the 2008 cyber attacks against Georgia seemingly supported the Russian 
Federation’s military and political objectives, the Russian government has not 
acknowledged or claimed responsibility for the attacks. Despite the Georgian 
government’s accusation that the Russian government sponsored the cyber campaign, 
analyst consensus maintains that no positive attacker linkage to the Russian government 
can be made, but “the historical record shows clear support of the Russian government 
and implied consent in its refusal to intervene or stop the hacker attacks.”79 Similar to the 
Estonia case, although the cyber attacks seemingly aligned with state interests, if the 
Russian state sponsored the attacks, it did so clandestinely. 
Just like the distributed denial of services attacks against Estonia, the DDoS 
attacks against Georgia overwhelmed the targets’ defensive capacity and the Georgian 
cyber security experts’ technical ability to mitigate the attacks. At the tactical level, when 
employed as a first strike, the technology appeared to favor the offense. After the initial 
shock of the attacks dissipated, Georgians found that the simpler online services—
government websites, but not electronic banking centers—could be easily re-provisioned 
on more robust third party servers. Although the attacks against Georgia demonstrated 
that offensive use of DDoS cyber weapons dominated defensive countermeasures, the 
attacks also revealed their limited value: defenders’ resilience showed that attackers can 
expect disruption and denial effects of cyber-attacks to have a limited duration.  
Unlike Estonian cyber infrastructure, Georgia’s Internet presence and reliance on 
online services at the time of the Russo–Georgian War was very limited. Importantly, this 
limited domestic infrastructure connected to the Internet via either Russian or Turkish 
Internet service providers.80 This limited path diversity further skewed the offense-
defense balance in favor of the attackers who were accused of using this path bottleneck 
78 Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat,” 193-4. 
79 Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, 45; “Russia/Georgia Cyber War,” 9. 
80 Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, 5-6. 
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to manipulate Georgian Internet traffic, enabling a cyber blockade not only logically 
through DDoS, but also by logically restricting or redirecting the physical flow of data. 
Although Georgian defenders found themselves overwhelmed by the offensive cyber 
weapons, they showed defensive resilience by exploiting a defining property of 
cyberspace, its manmade nature. Once pro-Russian hackers disabled Georgia’s 
government sites, Georgians simply restored those sites on more defensible third-party 
cyber terrain.  
Despite the offensive dominance of the cyber weapons employed during the 
conflicts, defenders also demonstrated that maneuver and resilience in cyberspace might 
be a more effective countermeasure than the direct defensive methods attempted a year 
earlier by Estonia’s CERT. This observation does not imply that defense ultimately 
dominates offense in cyberspace, but instead that offensive cyber operations have 
ephemeral effects—they do not take and hold ground. The lesson for strategists, 
therefore, may be that cyber attacks produce a narrow effect window and require precise 
timing; if used indiscriminately, cyber attacks lose their value as defenders will likely 
mitigate the attack vector and reconstitute their services in a more defensible 
configuration. Alternately, low sophistication cyber attacks may simply be used to disrupt 
the adversary’s military decision making process by adding another line of operations 
that defenders must react to. Five and a half years after the Russo-Georgian conflict, 
some of these lessons about effective application of cyber power appeared in the 2014 
Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. 
3. 2014 Russian–Ukrainian Conflict 
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in earnest after former 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich fled from office in February 2014 has been 
considered by many observers as typifying Russia’s recently articulated hybrid warfare 
concept. Hybrid, or non-linear war, relies on operations across the full spectrum of 
instruments of power applied by regular and irregular forces, and cyber and information 
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operations are an integral element of this multifaceted strategy.81 The Ukrainian conflict 
may be seen as the most contemporary refinement of the cyber power lessons from the 
Estonian and Georgian conflicts: offensive cyber operations conducted by Russian 
surrogates have undermined Ukrainian state legitimacy, embarrassed NATO allies, and 
intimidated opposition forces.  
A wide variety of cyber operations have been conducted throughout the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict, demonstrating a high degree of operational and tactical flexibility at 
the low, moderate, and high levels of technological sophistication. The pro-Russian, 
Ukrainian-based CyberBerkut hacker group claims many such accomplishments: the 
disruption of German government websites, intercept of U.S. –Ukrainian military 
cooperation documents, interference in the Ukrainian elections, DDoS attacks against 
NATO websites, blocking of Ukrainian government and media websites, and various 
negative messaging campaigns slandering pro-Ukrainian targets.82 Other pro-Russian 
cyber actors leaked embarrassing telephone call transcripts, physically disrupted 
telecommunications infrastructure, blocked mobile phone communications of political 
leaders, and exfiltrated sensitive data from Ukrainian government computers.83 Despite 
this variety of attack types, security experts speculate that the full arsenal of Russian 
cyber capability was not demonstrated, and that attack sophistication remained 
proportional to Russia’s limited political objectives and concurrent military operations.84 
The net effect of the cyber campaign appears to have positively contributed to the 
Russian strategy in Ukraine. The Russian formulation of hybrid war, according to the 
unofficial Gerasimov doctrine, relies on the information space—the Russian 
81 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, 
July 6, 2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-
non-linear-war/. 
82 CyberBerkut, accessed February 12, 2014, http://cyber-berkut.org/en/. 
83 Daisy Sindelar, “Brussels, Kyiv, Moscow React to Leaked Nuland Phone Call,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, February 7, 2014, sec. Ukraine, http://www.rferl.org/content/nuland-russia-eu-
ukraine-reaction/25256828.html; Tim Maurer and Scott Janz, “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Cyber and 
Information Warfare in a Regional Context,” October 17, 2014, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184345. 
84 David Lee, “Russia and Ukraine in Cyber ‘Stand-Off,’” BBC News, March 5, 2014, sec. 
Technology, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26447200. 
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terminological analogue to cyberspace—for “reducing the fighting potential of the 
enemy…influencing state structures and the population.”85 For example, efforts to 
influence Ukrainian parliamentary elections with DDoS attacks and a successful hack of 
Ukraine’s Central Election Commission network prior to the Presidential election did not 
lead to a pro-Russian outcome, but likely undermined electoral legitimacy as perceived 
by Ukrainians and Russians.86 Similarly, the intrusion into Ukraine’s telecommunication 
system and release of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland’s controversial 
telephone conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, created 
diplomatic embarrassment for the United States and possibly served to intimidate 
Ukraine’s other international supporters. Unlike such targeted, sophisticated cyber 
attacks, lower sophistication attacks like DDoS and site defacements, seem to have had 
little effect and instead led to retaliatory DDoS and defacement strikes by pro-Ukrainian 
actors.87 Through early 2015, Russia appears to have succeeded in its objectives in 
Crimea, and the cyber campaign contributed to this achievement, establishing Russian 
information dominance that limited Ukrainian command and control and facilitated pro-
Russian messaging. 
During the Estonia and Georgia cyber conflicts, direct attribution of pro-Russian 
cyber attacks to the Russian state proved impossible, and this aspect of cyber warfare was 
also true of the Ukrainian conflict. As before, Kremlin has denied involvement or 
sponsorship of the cyber attackers despite the obvious alignment with state interests. 
Additionally, Russians’ reliance on irregular and covert ground troops during the conflict 
in order to establish plausible deniability and thwart retaliation mirrors the attribution 
85 Galeotti, “‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’”  
86 “Hackers Target Ukraine’s Election Website,” Agence France-Presse, October 25, 2014, sec. 
Network Security, http://www.securityweek.com/hackers-target-ukraines-election-website; Anna 
Mihalenko, “Rigged Presidential Elections in Ukraine? Cyber Attack on the Central Election Commission,” 
Glboal Research, May 26, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/rigged-presidential-elections-in-ukraine-
cyber-attack-on-the-central-election-commission/5383843. 
87 Jen Weedon and Laura Galante, “Intelligence Analysts Dissect the Headlines: Russia, Hackers, 





                                                 
difficulty in cyberspace. According to both its doctrine and actual force employment, 
Russian military capability should be understood as intentionally obfuscating the military 
means used to achieve political ends. Because during the Ukraine conflict Russia 
demonstrated that it sought to benefit from attribution uncertainty throughout the 
spectrum of its instruments of power, by relying on covert and perhaps perfidious tactics 
Russia will likely cause other states to view potential pro-Russian actions with greater 
suspicion. Russian plausible deniability has lost credibility, and, therefore, despite 
difficulty in positive attribution, future cyber attacks matching pro-Russian attack profiles 
may become de facto attributed to Russia. 
The reporting of cyber operations during the ongoing Ukrainian conflict has been 
a narrative of successful offensive cyber operations. In March 2014, prior to the 
annexation of Crimea, security experts from FireEye predicted that Russian cyber 
strategy will be more subtle and sophisticated than the Russian-affiliated previous attacks 
against Estonia and Georgia, and that “Moscow is more likely to use narrowly focused, 
limited operations in support of strategic state objectives.”88 Though this prediction 
insightfully anticipated the use of more sophisticated attacks types, they may have 
overestimated the Russian government’s ability to control its proxies; CyberBerkut, for 
example, has relied on seemingly senseless DDoS attacks against non-strategic targets. 
As the result, the use of low sophistication DDoS and defacements precipitated a pro-
Ukrainian response in kind.89  In contrast, sophisticated attacks against Ukrainian targets, 
such as a Snake/Uroboros malware exploits of government computers and jamming of 
Ukrainian parliamentarians’ cell phones, appear to have succeeded without triggering 
analogous retaliation. Unfortunately, thus far, little has been reported about failed cyber 
attacks by each side, so it is difficult to identify instances in which defenders triumphed. 
As in previous cyber conflicts, the conflict in Ukraine demonstrated the dominance of 
offensive cyber weapons, but it has also shown a vulnerability to retaliation once widely 
available cyber weapons are launched. If the Russian government intentionally refrained 
from cyber escalation, as predicted by FireEye security experts, this may imply a Russian 
88 Weedon and Galante, “Intelligence Analysts Dissect the Headlines. ” 
89 Ibid. 
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perception that cyber weapons may provide a punitive deterrent. Such perceptions may 
contribute to explaining Russian investments in hardening its cyber terrain and passing 
reforms that limit diffusion of cyber power to Russian non-state actors over whom the 
state may not exercise sufficient control.90 
Lastly, according to the Freedom House assessment of Internet Freedom Status, 
though Internet use in Ukraine was not universal, and despite some efforts by the 
government to restrict Internet access, Ukrainians enjoyed a robust and open Internet 
prior to the conflict.91 Unlike Georgians, who could only access the Internet by traversing 
Russian and Turkish infrastructure, Ukraine’s ISPs were decentralized and had both 
terrestrial and satellite path diversity to the rest of the world.92 This relative openness of 
Ukraine’s cyberspace likely encouraged the continuous, broad range of cyber attacks 
within the country, including attacks by pro-Russian groups like CyberBerkut that claim 
to operate from within Ukraine. Unlike in Georgia in 2008, no attempts to isolate Ukraine 
in cyberspace have been reported. Instead, pro-Russian forces targeted key cyber terrain, 
such as the election system and the Crimean telecom infrastructure, at operationally 
decisive points. Most notably, as the Crimean invasion culminated, Russian Special 
Forces and Russian Military Intelligence contributed to the cyber campaign with physical 
operations designed to produce cyber effects; they installed  data intercept devices and 
physically isolated Crimean Internet and telecommunications infrastructure, 
demonstrating the synergistic potential of operations synchronize among the cyber and 
other warfighting domains.93 To date, the cyber campaigns against Ukraine demonstrated 
the vulnerability of an open national cyberspace and the value of cyber operations 
synchronized with ground objectives. 
90 [Evidence of these developments, such as investments such as content filtering systems and anti-
cybercrime law enforcement efforts, is addressed at greater length in subsequent sections and in Chapter 3.] 
91 Sanja Kelly et al., Freedom on the Net 2014, Freedom on the Net (Freedom House, 2014): 820-1, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf. 
92 Ibid., 830-2. 




                                                 
4. Other Sources of Cyber Capability 
The cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, assumed by the author 
to have been applications of Russian cyber power to achieve state interests, serve as 
examples of capability brandished by Russia. In addition to these overt cases, insight into 
Russian cyber capability can be gained from considering the capability of Russian cyber 
criminals and by making reasonable estimates about the capabilities of Russian 
intelligence services.    
a. Cybercrime 
After the 2008 Russo-Georgian Cyber War, security analysts concluded that the 
botnets used in the attack mimicked, or more likely, belonged to the Russian Business 
Network (RBN), a cybercriminal organization that gained notoriety in 2007 and 2008.94 
During the conflict, the RBN also likely performed hacks against Georgia’s routing 
infrastructure in an effort to complement the attempted cyber blockade.95 Additionally, 
RBN hosted the Internet forums that were so essential to the command and control of the 
cyber attacks, providing a so-called bulletproof hosting that gave attacker anonymity 
from security investigators and CERT responders.96 Although it is unclear under what 
conditions RBN’s resources were mobilized against Georgia, their resources played a key 
role in the cyber portion of the conflict. 
Since 2008, the Russian Business Network faded from prominence, but Russia 
remains a hotspot of cybercrime. Cybercrime is a term that encompasses a broad range of 
illegal activities such as media piracy, child pornography distribution, and identity theft. 
Certain types of cybercrime tools and tactics can also double as offensive cyber 
94 Project Grey Goose Phase II Report: The Evolving State of Cyber Warfare (GreyLogic, March 20, 
2009): 4, http://fserror.com/pdf/GreyGoose2.pdf. 
95 John Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,” New York Times, August 12, 2008, New York 
edition, sec. Technology, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=1&; “RBN 
(Russian Business Network) Now Nationalized, Invades Georgia Cyber Space,” Russian Business Network, 
August 9, 2008, RBN (Russian Business Network) now nationalized, invades Georgia Cyber Space,  
http://rbnexploit.blogspot.com/2008/08/rbn-georgia-cyberwarfare.html. 
96 Project Grey Goose Phase II Report, 15-7; “RBN - Georgia Cyberwarfare - Status and Attribution,” 
Russian Business Network, August 9, 2008, http://rbnexploit.blogspot.com/2008/08/rbn-georgia-
cyberwarfare-status-and.html; “RBN - Russian Cyberwar on Georgia: Report,” Russian Business Network, 
October 2, 2008, http://rbnexploit.blogspot.com/2008/10/rbn-russian-cyberwar-on-georgia.html. 
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operations. Botnets for rent, for example, can be used for conducting DDoS attacks, and 
malware droppers might also be used to gain remote access to a system in order to deliver 
a malicious payload or induce destructive system behavior. According to a Trend Micro 
analysis of the Russian cybercrime economy, today’s Russian cyber criminals specialize 
in for-purchase traffic direction systems (TDS)—tools that steer legitimate Internet traffic 
toward sites that conduct specific follow-on attacks.97 Though TDS is their current 
specialty, Russian cybercriminals also develop and sell other services that can be used for 
conducting a cyber attack: malware, exploit kits, bulletproof hosting, anonymizer 
services, hacking services, and DDoS attacks-by-the-hour.98 
Although other countries, including the United States, also suffer from 
cybercrime, the Russian government stands out as a potential consumer of its 
cybercriminal underground. As the Georgian conflict illustrated, pro-Russian non-state 
actors like the Nashi Youth organization likely served as proxies who either purchased or 
coopted criminal-developed cyber weapons.99 The Russian government has been 
criticized for its semi-permissive approach toward cybercrime, and this lax stance may 
reflect a deliberate intent to cultivate “an ecosystem of cybercrime” that may be 
mobilized to serve state interests during conflicts, avoiding direct attribution to the 
state.100  
b. State Capabilities 
Analysis of Russian cyber capability often alludes to presumed advanced 
technology and tradecraft of the Federal Security Services, Foreign Intelligence Service, 
and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Because 
these organizations operate with a high degree of secrecy, very little information on their 
97 Max Goncharov, Russian Underground Revisited, CyberCriminal Underground Economy Series 
(Trend Micro, 2014): 4, 7-8, http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-
papers/wp-russian-underground-revisited.pdf. 
98 Ibid., 16-8.  
99 Project Grey Goose Phase II Report, 5. 
100 Ronald Deibert, “Tracking the Emerging Arms Race in Cyberspace.” Interview, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 67, no. 1 (January/February 2011): 4. 
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capability is available, and capability analysis requires assumptions about capabilities 
that these organizations can be reasonably expected to possess. 
Unlike the highly publicized, persistent cyber espionage against America by 
Chinese state actors, Russian intelligence agencies have maintained a stealthy cyber 
profile. When describing the cyber threat to the nation, U.S. officials often refer to Russia 
as a potentially highly sophisticated cyber adversary capable, according to Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper, of carrying out attacks against critical 
infrastructure.101 Little evidence of this capability exists in the public record. For 
example, a serious cyber security breach of Department of Defense networks in 2008 by 
Agent.BTZ malware was only loosely linked to Russia intelligence services.102 Due to 
the difficulty in attributing cyber attacks and because Russia’s intelligence services are 
highly adept at maintaining secrecy, their cyber capabilities are assumed to be highly 
sophisticated as a reflection of those intelligence services’ overall reputations. 
Fortunately, some evidence of this high-level capability has been detected in the recent 
years, allowing for more reliable capability estimates. 
In 2014, security experts at FireEye published a special report, “APT28: A 
Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?” detailing what they argue is a state-
sponsored advanced persistent threat that Russia has used in various forms to collect 
foreign intelligence over the last seven years.103 This set of cyber operations, labeled 
APT28, has exploited Georgian, Eastern European government, NATO, and OSCE 
targets for defense-related information. The tools used by APT28 have evolved since 
2007, showing a development commitment that FireEye believes implies Russian 
101 James R. Clapper, “Remarks as Delivered by DNI James R. Clapper on ‘National Intelligence, 
North Korea, and the National Cyber Discussion’ at the International Conference on Cyber Security” 
presented at the International Conference on Cyber Security, Fordham University, January 8, 2015, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/208-speeches-interviews-2015/1156-
remarks-as-delivered-by-dni-james-r-clapper-on-”national-intelligence,-north-korea,-and-the-national-
cyber-discussion”-at-the-international-conference-on-cyber-security; Alexander, “House Armed Services 
Subcommittee." 
102 Phil Stewart and Jim Wolf, “Old Worm Won’t Die after 2008 Attack on Military,” Reuters, June 
16, 2011, US edition, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-
idUSTRE75F5TB20110617. 
103 APT28 - A Window Into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?, Special Report (FireEye, 2014): 
3, https://www2.fireeye.com/apt28.html. 
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government sponsorship.104 If the report’s conclusions are correct, it illuminates Russia’s 
ability not only to disrupt cyber systems, but also to gain access to secure systems, 
enabling a range of hostile cyber operations: intelligence collection, data manipulation, 
and remote system control. Due to the inherent perishability of high-end cyber payloads, 
unless they are used in a conflict that rises to jus ad bellum conditions, such payloads will 
likely remain merely hypothesized, but highly sophisticated delivery systems like those 
used by ATP28 may serve as a payload capability indicator. Because U.S. officials 
consistently categorize Russian intelligence services’ cyber capabilities as on par with 
other leading states, and because the ability of the Russian state actors to gain access to 
secure foreign networks has been demonstrated, strategic analysis should assume that the 
Russian military and intelligence services possess highly sophisticated offensive cyber 
weapons. 
B. CYBER GEOGRAPHY 
The geography of cyberspace is an important factor for gauging a state’s cyber 
capability. States’ Internet topologies, infrastructure resources, and control over the 
salient features of their cyberspace vary greatly. These geographic differences likewise 
differentiate their utility for offensive and defensive. Martin Libicki argues that the 
defensive operations in cyberspace are in effect actions that “change the particular 
features of one’s own portion of cyberspace itself so that it is less tolerant of attack.”105 
The extent to which a state may have the technical means to modify this terrain may 
therefore translate to its defensive capacity. The following section will consider Russia’s 
cyber geography according to two categories: the key features of Russian cyberspace and 
the Russian government’s technological ability to manipulate its cyberspace. 
 
104 APT28, 19.  
105 Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy 
for the Information Society 8, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 326. 
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1. Cyber Terrain Features 
Among U.S. officials and security analysts, it is canon that national cyber security 
relies on a partnership between the government and the private sector; it is the private 
sector that owns and operates the vast majority of American critical infrastructure and is 
exposed to the preponderance of cyber attacks.106 Although the nature of the 
government-private relationship in Putin’s Russia is a mixture of state and crony 
capitalism, Russian industry likewise plays an important role in Russian cyber security. 
The key features of Russian cyber terrain are its telecommunications infrastructure, 
hardware supply chain, and information security technology sector. 
The backbone of the Internet is the telecommunication sector—the organizations 
that provide broadband, cellular, and satellite transport for data. Russia’s broadband and 
mobile communications sectors are highly consolidated; just six companies dominate 
77.1% of the broadband market, while 92% of the mobile market is controlled by four 
operators.107 Although most of these companies are privately owned, the largest operator 
that controls one third of all Russian broadband access, Rostelecom, is state-owned.108 
Importantly, these companies operate, if not in collusion with, then under the coercion of 
the Russian government through its onerous telecommunication regulations. 
Additionally, because some of these companies also operate abroad, those countries 
effectively rely on Russian cyber terrain to access their own cyber resources.109 
Although the Russian government exercises some control over the 
telecommunications infrastructure operators, the physical infrastructure of Russia’s 
cyberspace, the hardware and software components that transmit, process, and store data, 
is almost exclusively of foreign design and manufacture. In an interview with Radio Echo 
Moscow, Major-General Igor Sheremet, the Chairman of the Russian Federation’s 
106 James P. Farwell, “Industry's Vital Role in National Cyber Security,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
(Winter 2012): 10, 34-35, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/winter_12/farwell.pdf.  
107 Sanja Kelly et al., Freedom on the Net 2014: Russia, Freedom on the Net (Freedom House, 2014): 
3, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/Russia.pdf. 
108 Kelly, Freedom on the Net 2014: Russia, 3.  
109 Patrick Tucker, “Why Ukraine Has Already Lost the Cyberwar, Too,” Defense One, April 28, 
2014, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/04/why-ukraine-has-already-lost-cyberwar-too/83350/. 
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General Staff’s Military-Science Committee, acknowledged that Russia relies on Cisco 
routers and other foreign technology for its cyber infrastructure.110 He argues, however, 
that the Russian government minimizes this risk through a rigorous component 
certification program, and through state projects to create domestically-manufactured 
electronic components for military and other critical uses. Although he acknowledges that 
it is unrealistic to expect Russian technology companies to outcompete foreign 
manufacturers in the domestic market, Sheremet claims that Russia already has the 
domestic capacity to supply 30% of its military requirements, and expects this number to 
grow to 95% by 2020.111 
In a 2014 article that he authored, Major-General Sheremet further asserts that 
Russia’s technological dependence is only temporary. According to him, the Russian 
government is making a serious academic investment to leapfrog current technology 
leaders by investing in quantum and optical computing.112 While such technological 
leaps may be more hopeful than practical, the Russian government has taken concrete 
steps to stimulate domestic technology development. The most prominent initiative, the 
Skolkovo Innovation Center, aspires to create a Russian Silicon Valley.113 Despite 
continued financial commitment from the Russian government, this project faces an 
uncertain future, however. Early international enthusiasm and support for Skolkovo has 
declined due to Ukraine conflict-related economic sanctions, while corruption-ridden 
construction projects missed deadlines and exceeded cost estimates.114 Whether this 
attempt to grow Russia’s own technology base succeeds increasingly seems unlikely.  
110 Sergei Buntman, Aleksandr Kurennoy, and Anatoliy Ermolin, “Informatsionnaya i 
Kiberbezopasnost’ [Information and Cybersecurity],” transcript, Radio Echo Moscow (Moscow, December 
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Cybersecurity];” Igor Sheremet, “Kiberugrozy Rossii Rastut —Chast’ I [Cyberthreats to Russia Grow - 
Part I,” Voyenno-promyshlennyy Kur’yer, February 12, 2014, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/19092. 
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The highlight of the Russian information security technology sector is the 
privately owned security company Kaspersky Lab. This cyber security company named 
after its cofounder, Eugene Kaspersky, has continued to play a leading role in 
international cyber security, rivaling its competitors: McAfee, Norton, and Symantec. 
According to its website, Kaspersky Lab products protect over 400 million users 
worldwide, and the company has established a renowned reputation by being the first to 
identify and analyze Stuxnet, as well as its derivative variants.115 The company’s security 
analysis extends beyond conventional cyber threats; according to Kaspersky, his 
company’s research and developments also includes secure operating systems to defend 
SCADA-reliant critical infrastructure—a vital area of cyber security.116 
In addition to the Kaspersky Lab’s impressive technical prowess, the company 
has an intriguing relationship with the Russian state. Although in an interview with the 
Russian newspaper, “Kommersant,” Kaspersky casually laughs off the interviewer’s 
suggestion that he coordinates with the Putin administration, the company’s relationship 
with the Russian state is potentially suspect.117 Eugene Kaspersky began his education at 
a KGB-backed science academy and applied this training as a Soviet army intelligence 
officer.118 A decade later, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., he started Kaspersky Lab. 
According to Wired Magazine’s profile of Kaspersky labs, although the FSB does not 
tamper with Kaspersky Lab software, the company and the state security agency maintain 
a close working relationship.119 Russia’s Foreign Ministry likewise relies on Kaspersky 
Lab services, while Kaspersky often echoes the Russian government’s cyber rhetoric at 
international forums.120 The extent of this relationship is a matter of speculation, but 
115 “About Kaspersky Lab,” Kaspersky Lab, accessed January 19, 2014, 
http://www.kaspersky.com/about. 
116 “Yesli Budut ‘Valit’” Region, Gorod Ili Stranu Tselikom — Do Svidan’ya [If They Attack a 
Region, City, or the Whole Country - Goodbye],” Kommersant, March 28, 2013, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2155845. 
117 Ibid. 
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Magazine, July 23, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/07/ff_kaspersky/. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Oleg Demidov and Maxim Simonenko, “Flame in Cyberspace,” Security Index: A Russian Journal 
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Kaspersky Lab’s technology prominence is not. The company is a key actor in 
international cyber security, and it is cloud-based threat network may also double as a 
powerful sensor and defensive mechanism that operates from within Russian cyberspace. 
2. Cyberspace Control 
The Russian government’s position on the role of the Internet in society has 
varied over the past decade. According to the Freedom House report, “Freedom on the 
Net 2014: Russia,” 61% of Russia’s population had access to the Internet in 2013.121 
Though this Internet penetration rate lags behind France’s 82%, United States’ 84%, and 
United Kingdom’s 90% Internet penetration rate for 2013, it nonetheless represents a 
sizable segment of the worlds’ Internet users.122 Aforementioned cyber capability case 
studies demonstrated the Russian state’s reliance on its patriotic Internet users, hackers, 
and cyber criminals as a militia to be mobilized in support of state interests. While the 
hacktivists enjoyed a semi-permissive Internet environment at the time of the Estonia and 
Georgia cyber attacks, the rest of Russia’s population enjoyed a liberal Internet 
experience. This attitude of the Russian government’s toward Russia’s own Internet users 
has been changing since 2012, however. During the 2011 parliamentary election, 
opposition groups rallied on Internet social media sites to protest the Putin regime.123 
Since then, the Russian government has made changes to Russian Internet architecture 
and domestic policy. Freedom House calculates that these changes were the most severe 
decline of Internet freedom of any state in 2013.124 This curtailment of Russians’ Internet 
freedom has resulted in an improved defensiveness of Russia’s cyber terrain, and 
coincidentally also made attacking from Russia’s cyberspace more difficult. 
Russia’s battle against the Tor network technology epitomized these technological 
changes. In July of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin made headlines when the 
121 Kelly, Freedom on the Net 2014: Russia, 2.  
122 Kelly, Freedom on the Net 2104, 300, 877, 858,  
123 Natalie Duffy, Internet Freedom in Vladimir Putin’s Russia: The Noose Tightens (American 
Enterprise Institute, January 2015): 1-2, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Internet-freedom-
in-Putins-Russia.pdf. 
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Russian Interior Ministry offered a 3.9 million-ruble bounty for a technical solution for 
identifying Tor (The Onion Router) users.125 This solicitation was just Russia’s latest 
effort at curbing Tor use; the Russian government had previously considered legislation 
to ban the technology and related software products.126 The government’s rationale for 
targeting Tor and its users is to curb certain types of cybercrime—Tor is the premier 
technology for masking online identity. For the same reason, it has also become the tool 
of choice for critics of the Putin regime, who use the network to circumvent Russia’s 
other increasingly draconian Internet censorship measures.127 Though the Russian 
government has yet to succeed in developing a Tor countermeasure, when it does, it will 
be capable not only of thwarting child pornographers and political dissidents, but it will 
also improve its defense against many variants of cyber attacks. Because Tor functions as 
an anonymous network overlaid on top of existing networks, it is commonly used as an 
unattributable mechanism for attacks command and control and for establishing a secure 
pathway for cyber attacks.128 If successful, Russia’s efforts to prevent Tor use will strip a 
layer of non-attribution from cyber attacks. Unlike its permissive attitude toward 
cybercrime at the time of the Russo-Georgian War, more recently, the Russian 
government appears willing to sacrifice the offensive capability of its criminal proxies in 
favor of improved defensiveness. 
Restrictions on Tor use would deny users secure and anonymous access to online 
resources, but the Russian government has also attempted to limit anonymity through less 
sophisticated measures. User attribution begins with access to the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP). According to TNS Russia, a research firm cited by Freedom House, half 
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of Russia’s Internet users access the web via their mobile devices.129 This mobile access 
is tracked to individuals through SIM cards; which in Russia must be registered to a 
person’s passport. The same passport-based registration also applies to terrestrial, paid 
Internet service.130 A law passed in August 2014 further restricts Internet access by 
likewise requiring passport information to connect to state-funded public, and possibly, to 
commercially-provided public Wi-Fi Internet access points.131 The sum effect of these 
rules is that within Russian cyberspace, one’s cyber persona is strongly attributed to the 
physical persona upon connecting to the Internet. 
In addition to restricting anonymous access and anonymous transport, Russian 
authorities have attempted to limit anonymous content. A law passed in May of 2014 has 
established a standard for content attribution; blogging sites that attract a daily audience 
of more than 3,000 visitors must register with the Federal Service for Supervision of 
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, or Roskomnadzor. This law 
requires bloggers meeting this threshold to provide personally identifiable information 
and assume financial liability for the accuracy of the contents on their blogs.132 To 
support the technical ability of the state to enforce this policy, the Russian government 
also introduced law that mandates data localization. By 2016, companies that collect and 
store data belonging to Russian citizens will be required to physically store that data on 
Russian territory.133 When implemented, this requirement will enable easier data 
intercept, data retrieval, and possibly data protection by moving Russian citizens’ data 
within the state’s legal and physical jurisdiction. 
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Along with the changes to Russian cyberspace to restrict anonymity, the Russian 
government has also implemented technology that restricts—based on content—
information flow within Russian cyberspace. Beginning with Putin’s election to the 
presidency in 2012, his government has passed legislation has enables the Russian 
government to filter website content. These restrictions began under the pretense of 
protecting children on the Internet: on November 1, 2012, the Russian government passed 
a law enabling Roskomnadzor to blacklist offender websites without trial.134 On 
December 2013, the government expanded these powers to authorize, without due 
process, the shutdown of websites “for participation in unsanctioned public actions.”135 
Though the Russian government’s ability and willingness to silence free speech on the 
Internet is disconcerting from a human rights perspective, from an offense-defense 
analysis perspective this ability also reflects changes to the defensiveness of Russia’s 
cyber terrain. The creation and access of content within Russian cyberspace is now 
controlled through technical measures implemented by Russian ISPs at the behest of the 
Russian government. These content blacklists are a form of allow-by-default deny-by-
exception security posture, and though this posture is not as restrictive as a deny-by-
default allow-by-exception security stance, it represents a shift away from a fully open 
allow-all Internet environment to a nationally censored, individually attributable 
Internet.136 
In addition to the Roskomnadzor’s control of data flow, within Russian 
cyberspace, the government dominates the analogue to the physical high ground with 
FSB sensors: its System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) allows the state to 
intercept and monitor Russian Internet traffic and analog telecommunications. SORM is a 
descendent of Soviet-era KGB research and development efforts; over three generations 
of SORM device refinements, the FSB has developed the capability to completely track, 
monitor, and store all of Russians’ electronic communications. The initial 1990s SORM 
134 “Russia Internet Blacklist Law Takes Effect,” BBC News, October 13, 2012, sec. Technology, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-20096274. 
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variant, SORM-1 intercepted and recorded land and mobile telephone conversations. 
Versions 2 and 3 expanded that capability to include Internet traffic—including bitwise 
capture and storage of all transmitted data and metadata.137 Russian law requires all 
Russian ISPs to install this surveillance hardware and configure their data routing to pass 
through SORM devices, which in turn forward that data to FSB and other Russian 
intelligence services for additional exploitation.138  
Although SORM is a powerful sensor technology, its reach is limited by its 
physical placement. The devices can only be placed within Russian jurisdiction—
intercept of data transmissions to and from internationally hosted content is more 
problematic.139 Some of this limitation may be overcome by SORM’s speculated ability 
to perform deep packet inspection, or the ability to view the content of the data packets 
encapsulated with TCP/IP and UDP communications protocols used for much of the 
Internet data transmission. The devices, therefore, may be able to capture and reconstruct 
a portion of the unencrypted communication between Russian users and non-Russian 
resources.140 However, encrypted communication by popular social media and other 
Internet service sites is increasingly becoming the norm, and this trend will be a growing 
challenge for FSB. The Russian government may have a strategy to overcome these 
encryption barriers. When Russian data localization legislation takes effect in 2016 and 
Russian user data has to be hosted at Russian locations, SORM boxes at the data centers 
will likely be placed on the unencrypted side of the communication path, preempting 
many data-in-transport encryption safeguards. There is a technology race between 
methods to intercept data and techniques to hide it, but at the movement, Russia’s SORM 
appears to have the upper hand within Russian cyberspace. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The historical case studies of Russian-affiliated cyber attacks clearly demonstrate 
that the offensive cyber weapons in the Russian government’s arsenal have the 
advantage—cyber attacks consistently succeeded at disrupting or compromising their 
targets. The available evidence, therefore, best supports hypotheses H1. Russia’s cyber 
capability is offensive and the posture is indistinguishable as either offensive or defensive 
and H3. Russia’s cyber capability is offensive and the posture is distinguishable as either 
offensive or defensive. This delineation, however, acknowledges that Russia has access to 
cyber weapons along the spectrum of offensive-defense cyber capability, and not in 
strictly offensive weapons. Although it is infamous for widely perceived complicity in 
the Estonian and Georgian cyber attacks, the Russian government is also increasingly 
investing in defensive capability, and this may suggest a future shift in its capability 
balance. Alternately, and more likely, Russia may be investing in both offensive and 
defensive capabilities, but the defensive investments are less secretive. 
Because this chapter’s case studies are instances cyber weapons use, the analytic 
difficulty caused by the inherent secrecy of cyber weapons capability is not as 
challenging in practice as it is in theory. Russia has notoriously been at the forefront of 
cyber weapon use, so there is less uncertainty about the capability and performance of its 
cyber weapons. Although, as illustrated by the discovery of APT28, Russia may 
reasonably be presumed to possess and continuously develop high sophistication 
offensive cyber weapons, the historic record of its cyber weapon use is that of low to 
moderate technical sophistication weapons employed with increasingly improving 
tradecraft. This weapon selection and use has two important implications on the degree to 
which Russia’s offensive cyber weapons are dominant over the defense. The cyber 
attacks, as in the case of the Russo-Georgian conflict, though skillfully coordinated and 
executed, either targeted known vulnerabilities or used publicly available attack tools. 
Thus, although analysis of the international system predicts some weapons use restraint 
due to the desire for states to maintain their perishable cyber capabilities secret, Russia’s 
reliance on publically available tools and published exploits does not suffer from this 
restraint. Additionally, as Patrick Malone estimates in his offense-defense cost ratio 
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comparison between the brute force Estonian cyber attacks and the highly sophisticated 
Stuxnet attack that used unpublished exploits and a custom payload, low sophistication 
attacks are several orders of magnitude less costly for attackers.141 Lastly, Russian law 
enforcement’s semi-permissive attitude toward cybercrime further lowers the state’s cost 
for maintaining its low-end capabilities. By using high cost ratio cyber weapons whose 
technology is already public, Russia pays a lower cost for weapon use. Though the 
disadvantage of Russians’ cheaper cyber weapon selection is lower likelihood of success, 
the disappointingly long timeframe for securing systems against published exploits 
presents Russians with a target-rich environment.142 
Russian cyber weapons also escalate instability because their weapon type and 
tactics increase the incentive for cyber retaliation. The DDoS and defacement attacks 
used in Georgia and Ukraine did not destroy their victims’ capacity to respond in kind, 
leading to retaliatory strikes. Importantly, because proxy actors conducted pro-Russian 
attacks, the Russian government was less able to restrain their proxies’ weapons selection 
and targeting than if state actors conducted the attacks. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
establish the exact nature of this relationship, and the degree of control or direction that 
the Russian government can exercise over its proxies. Additionally, both Georgia and 
Ukraine followed the Russian model for cyber attacks and relied on their own non-state 
proxies for retaliation. Consequently, the Russian cyber capability dramatically raises the 
international instability in cyberspace—its low-end cyber weapon use encourages 
retaliation without the institutional restraint mechanisms that apply to conventional 
conflict and it encourages the diffusion of cyber power to non-state actors. While FireEye 
security experts suspected that the prospect of retaliation along with the weapons’ relative 
crudeness might deter Russia from using low-end cyber weapons in Ukraine, because the 
Russian government relies on surrogates, such restraint is difficult to achieve. 
Russian cyber weapon capability encourages aggression, but Russia is also 
changing its cyber geography to increase its defensiveness under the pretext of 
141 Malone, “Offense-Defense Balance in Cyberspace, ” i.  




                                                 
safeguarding against internal cyber threats, but this technology is also applicable to 
external threats. Professor Wade Huntley observes that one explanation for why 
cyberspace has not been designed to increase its defensiveness is that states may believe 
that the cost of rebuilding it to be more defensive exceeds the cumulative costs of 
potential attacks.143 This notional challenge of cost sharing and return on investment 
appears to be recognized in practice by U.S. critical infrastructure security guidance and 
policy documents.144 Russian willingness to invest in restructuring its cyber terrain 
suggests that the Russian government increasingly views its cyberspace as an existential 
threat to the regime due to potential political opponents’ ability to organize and mobilize 
online. Thus, the Russian Federation’s cost analysis for hardening cyberspace differs 
from the Western cost analysis that puts a positive value on the Internet’s openness and 
freedom from heavy-handed government regulation; to the Russian government the 
openness of the Internet incurs an additional security cost. 
The technological changes that the Russian government has implemented in its 
cyberspace increasingly shift weapon capability in favor of defenders. The Russian 
government can monitor, intercept, and block various types of Internet traffic. It can also 
reduce actor anonymity. In the most extreme case, the Russian government may possess 
the capability to create a fractured cyberspace, isolating itself from external threats—the 
pinnacle of geographical defensiveness.145 At the present, however, these capabilities 
appear to be internally facing, intended to suppress domestic cyber threats. If in the future 
these defensive features are reoriented externally, though this change would improve 
Russian defenders’ advantage, this change might nonetheless increase the security 
dilemma. If Russia’s cyber defensiveness exceeds the average defensiveness of other 
states, it may be even more enticed to act aggressively, knowing that others’ ability to 
retaliate is reduced. 
143 Huntley, “Offense, Defense, and Cyber War,” 16. 
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Finally, Russia’s changes to its cyber geography potentially undermine its 
offensive weapons’ capability. Its terrain’s defensive features such as content filtering 
and reduced anonymity negate their weapons and tactics effectiveness. If the Russian 
government implements security backdoors in their sensors and defense tools to allow 
proxy actors to continue to operate, in doing so they negate their plausible deniability and 
potentially signal early warnings and indicators. The alternative is that Russian proxies 
move their operations outside of Russian cyberspace, but in doing so they expose 
themselves to foreign jurisdictions where they might be detected and thwarted with 
greater ease. Though this may be a promising consequence of Russian cyber terrain 
hardening, it is likely only to decrease the security instability caused by Russia’s least 
sophisticated weapons and actors. 
This chapter considered Robert Jervis’s key security dilemma variable as applied 
to Russia—whether Russia has invested in offensive or defense cyber capability, as 
reflected by Russia’s brandished cyber weapons and by the properties of Russian cyber 
terrain. The author’s conclusion is that Russian cyber capability shows an existing 
investment in offensive cyber weapons, as well as efforts to improve the defensiveness of 
its cyber terrain. Alarmingly, the weapon capability of Russia and the diffusion of cyber 
power to non-state actors appears to create security dilemma pressures that may be more 
acute than the security dilemma expected at the international system level of analysis. 
The following chapter will consider Jervis’s second variable—whether Russian cyber 
posture can be distinguished as offensive or defensive by evaluating Russian cyber policy 
and doctrine. 
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III. RUSSIAN CYBER POSTURE 
This chapter seeks to determine whether Russia’s cyber posture is distinguishable 
as either offensive or defensive. The following sections examine Russians’ official and 
unofficial conception of cyber power, the cyber doctrine of the Russian Federation’s 
Armed Forces, and Russia’s efforts to shape the international cyber environment thru 
international institutions. If Russia’s cyber posture is distinguishable as either offensive 
or defensive, these three lanes of inquiry may provide insight into its orientation.  
A. RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING OF CYBER POWER 
The Russian view on cyber power and on Russia’s own cyber capabilities differs 
in significant ways from the American perspective. Most importantly, Russian academics 
and military experts conceive of cyber warfare more broadly than Western strategists and 
view Russia not as an aggressor, but as a vulnerable state defending itself from a hostile 
global cyber campaign. Though Russian cyber terminology differs in key ways, Russian 
cyber experts recognize many of the same challenges of cyber power—offense 
dominance, secrecy, non-attribution, escalation, etc.—that are also widely discussed by 
Western academics. 
Understanding the terminological difference between U.S. and Russian cyber 
discourse is essential for contextualizing how Russian thinking about cyber power shapes 
Russia’s doctrine and international position on cyber security. Keir Giles summarizes the 
Russian view of cyber war as informatsionnaya voyna—a “holistic concept” of 
information war that includes computer network operations, electronic warfare, 
psychological operations, and information operations.146 Russians subdivide this broad 
concept of information war into two components: information-technological and the 
information-psychological.147 Major-General Sheremet describes information-technical 
146 Giles, “‘Information Troops,’” 46. 
147 Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008,” 
in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, ed. Stephen J. Blank 
and Richard Weitz (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 266, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub997.pdf. 
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attacks as cyberattacks ranging from influence operations via website defacements to 
physical damage resulting from altered rocket trajectories.148 Information-psychological 
operations, in contrast, include operations that attack the morale and the perceptions of 
the population, as exemplified by the Arab Spring, Orange Revolution, and even the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.149  
This understanding of cyber power is not limited to just a handful of Russian 
scholars. In an extensive literature review of Russian academic and official writing, 
Stephen Blank demonstrates that this is mainstream Russian thinking about cyber power, 
with important consequences. By incorporating the struggle of ideologies into cyber 
power, Russian analysts continue “the Leninist tradition of a constant state of siege 
within and between states, societies, and blocs.”150 As a consequence, the Russian state 
and its cyber analysts discuss cyberspace issues—to Russians “information space”—as a 
lens for “viewing the domestic and international situation.”151 This inclusion of hostile 
content as a source of cyber threat differs from the West’s more narrow focus on strictly 
hostile code and leads to Russians’ particular perception of peacetime and wartime cyber 
threats and vulnerabilities.152 In the following discussion, the author uses Russian 
information war terminology—cyber power is an implied component of that definition 
but cannot be extricated from the Russian conception of information warfare for 
standalone assessment. 
1. Hostile Content 
Russians’ understanding of hostile content as an information security issue is 
illustrated in an article in the journal Security Index: A Russian Journal on International 
Security by Elena Zinovyeva, who describes the role of information-psychological 
aspects of cyber power in shaping the security dilemma at the international level. This 
148 Sheremet, “Kiberugrozy Rossii Rastut —Chast’ I. ” 
149 Igor Sheremet, “Kiberugrozy Rossii Rastut —Chast’ II [Cyberthreats to Russia Grow - Part II,” 
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analysis cites and builds on the work of Martin Libicki and Joseph Nye to conclude that 
the balance of power among nations has been disturbed by “the very nature of 
international politics in the information sphere.”153 The source of this instability, she 
argues, is U.S. digital diplomacy. Zinovyeva describes the policy of digital diplomacy as 
a series of programs enabled by “technological instrument[s]” with which American 
diplomats engage foreign populaces through organizations such as the Department of 
State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Agency for 
International Development.154 The notable goals and priorities of these programs are: 
• “discredit the ideological enemies of the United States” 
• “limit Russia’s media presence in the former Soviet Republics” 
• “creat[e] information services aimed at supporting the opposition in 
authoritarian countries” 
• “creat[e] shadow Internet systems and independent mobile networks 
which...can help the opponents of authoritarian regimes to exchange 
information online, circumventing the government’s restrictions.”155 
According to Zinovyeva, this digital diplomacy is enabled by structural changes in the 
international system brought about by advances in cyberspace, and although the United 
States is currently at the forefront of capitalizing on the power potential of these 
technologies, the Russian Federation should develop its own offensive information-
psychological cyber weapons to be used in the information confrontation with the West. 
Importantly, Russia must make this investment urgently—“it is quickly running out of 
time.”156 
U.S. Army War College Professor Stephen Blank’s assessment of the Russian 
perspective on information-psychological operations in cyberspace is starker: Russia is 
fighting a domestic counterinsurgency.157 Russian politicians, heads of state agencies, 
and academics believe that the United States is actively engaged in a network war against 
153 Zinovyeva, “U.S. Digital Diplomacy, ” 38. 
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157 Blank, “Russian Information Warfare,” 32. 
 49 
                                                 
Russia, facilitating a domestic insurgency.158 Zinovyeva’s argument described previously 
is typical of Russian academic literature, and in Blank’s opinion, this view reflects an 
attempt to externalize the causes of the domestic instability of an illiberal democracy.159 
Whereas a Western perspective on the Arab Spring, the color revolutions, and the civil 
disturbances following the 2011 Russian parliamentary election focuses on issues 
prominent at the state level of analysis, Russians see the same international events as 
caused by the international security dilemma stemming from offensive application of 
information technology. This divergence in analytic perspectives is important for 
contextualizing Russian doctrine development and stance on international cyber issues. 
In addition to the lessons drawn from the role of Internet technologies in fostering 
worldwide anti-authoritarian political movements, Russian military experience in recent 
armed conflicts—the Chechen Wars and especially the 2008 Russo-Georgian War—has 
also shaped Russians’ understanding of the relevance of cyber power in conducting IW 
and IO as part of a military campaign. While the military phase of the Russo-Georgian 
War was swift and decisively in favor of the Russian Federation, in the Russian 
government’s view the perception of the conflict and the perception of its legitimacy by 
the international community was more important than what occurred on the battlefield.160  
To the Kremlin and to Russian critics alike, the Russo-Georgian conflict 
demonstrated Russian shortcomings in strategic communications strategies and faulty 
technical performance of their information-enabled weapons systems.161 Subsequent 
calls for reform focused on the Russian Federation’s ability to shape and influence 
international perceptions of future conflicts.162 Information security analyses were less 
common than strategic communications criticism, however. Among such analyses, 
Colonel-General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn’s notable cyber security-focused critique, while 
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recognizing the low cost of cyber weapons and heightened international vulnerability of 
states due to new technologies, emphasized the new capacity of information weapons to 
target population morale, provoke social and ethnic conflicts, and undermine government 
legitimacy.163 In contrast, Western observers and analysts focused much more on the 
technical details of the cyber attacks during the Russo-Georgian War, and on those 
weapons’ implications to collective security arrangements, law of armed conflict, and 
technical characteristics of cyber conflicts. This difference in lessons learned from the 
Russo-Georgian War illustrates the analytics lens with which Russians approach cyber 
power—hostile content is central to Russian understanding of information confrontation. 
2. Hostile Code 
Although Russian cyber power scholarship emphasizes the importance of hostile 
content, or the information-psychological aspect of information warfare, Russian thinkers 
also recognize value of information-technical weapons—hostile code. This technical and 
strategic discussion of cyber power is evident in the Russian press, academic 
publications, and military journals. A frequent commentator in public forums on Russian 
Security issues, Major-General Sheremet explains that potential cyber attacks on its 
critical infrastructure are a vital information-technical threat to the Russian Federation.164 
His position is particularly interesting: although he explains the varied approaches the 
Russian government is undertaking to reduce these risks, he also notes that because of the 
difficulty of positively attributing cyber attacks, the Russian response to such attacks 
would be simply to do nothing and “uchit’sya na oshibkakh”—learn from mistakes.165  
Eugene Kaspersky takes a similar view; Russia must make security investments in 
its critical infrastructure, information technology infrastructure, and telecommunications 
sectors. Although such defensive measures may reduce Russia’s vulnerability to 
cybercrime and cyber terrorism, in the case of a true cyber warfare threat, he argues that 
no defensive measures will be sufficient to absorb through resilience or deter through 
163 Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory, ”290-1. 
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165 Buntman et al., “Informatsionnaya i Kiberbezopasnost.” 
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denial the attacks. Russia would have to retaliate.166 Though both Sheremet’s and 
Kaspersky’s responses to cyber attack are not nearly as drastic as V. I. Tsymbal’s 1996 
assertion that “Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons first against the means and 
forces of information warfare, and then against the aggressor state itself,” all three 
positions stem from a recognition of information-technical attacks’ offensive dominance 
and Russia’s vulnerability to such attacks.167 
Russian academic publications also increasingly publish analyses of strategic 
implications of informational-technical aspects of cyber weapons. The Russian Institute 
for Policy Studies Center’s journal, Security Index, for example, published eight articles 
dedicated to cyber security topics in 2013. In comparison, it dedicated five articles to 
cyber issues in 2012, and only two articles in the four years prior to then.168 The analysis 
that is published is both technically competent and insightful. In describing 
“Cyberwarfare and Russian Style of Cyberdefense,” Oleg Demidov’s analysis of DDoS 
attacks and the Stuxnet family of malicious code identifies important issues: non-
attribution, asymmetric response, power diffusion, offensive retaliation, and a zero-sum 
arms race.169 The Russian reaction to the international system shaped by such weapons, 
argues Demidov, is an increased militarization of Russian cybersecurity functions—a 
mirror imaging of U.S. CYBERCOM.170  
Dmitry I. Grigoriev presents another viewpoint on Russian cybersecurity 
measures at the EastWest Institute. “Some nations,” he writes, “set up special units to 
conduct cyber warfare,” and this militarization creates an inherently offensive, covert, 
166 “Yesli Budut ‘Valit’ Region, Gorod Ili Stranu Tselikom. ” [The translation of the Kaspersky's 
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and indefensible cross-border threat.171 The Russian government’s approach to 
countering this threat to international stability, he explains, is to create a series of bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements that ban the use of cyber weapons for military-political 
purposes. Such international arrangements should also create technical mechanisms for 
establishing attack attribution and adopting Internet protocols that secure the Internet.172 
Though Demidov’s and Grigoriev’s positions differ in their proposed solutions, their 
analysis is representative of a defensive tone to Russian cyber analysis—Russia is 
responding defensively to a perceived security arms race led by the United States. 
Finally, the Russian Armed Forces demonstrate some understanding of cyber 
weapons and of American doctrinal and technical developments in cyberspace. In the 
Military Thought article “Operations in Cyberspace: Theory, Politics, and Law,” the 
authors summarize unclassified U.S. Department of Defense publications pertaining to 
cyber operations. In addition to summarizing American cyber doctrine, the authors 
criticize it for, in their view, failing to integrate international law into the concept of 
cyber operations, for increasing international tension with an ambiguous retaliatory 
policy in light of the difficulty of cyber attribution, and for approaching the security 
dilemma caused by the nature of cyber weapons through a NATO and not an 
international framework.173 A similar analysis of cyber power emphasizes that the United 
States, China, United Kingdom, and many other countries are forming cyber attack units, 
and that the United States, specifically, views cyber war as inevitable and as serious as a 
confrontation in any other military theater.174 Both analyses, while introducing their 
readers to cyber definitions, terms, and concepts, also point out that the cyber domain is 
characterized by an already in-progress offensive arms race. 
171 Dmitry I. Grigoriev, “Russian Priorities and Steps Towards Cybersecurity,” in Global Cyber 
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It is notable that cyber power analysis by Russian military officers focuses much 
less on operational art and force development than it does on the role of international 
institutions. The Military Thought article “Potential Approaches to Implementing the 
Russian Federation’s Military Policies on International Information Security in the 
Present Situation” only vaguely references the military’s role in the “creation of a 
Eurasian system for joint response to threats.”175 Instead, the authors criticize the Euro-
Atlantic approach to cyber security as militarizing cyberspace, violating national 
sovereignty under the pretense of law enforcement, and ultimately fostering an arms 
race.176 The alternative they suggest is to support the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
approach that strives to restrict new information weapon development, limits existing 
weapons use, and provides a mechanism for collective response to cyber aggression.177 
In what may well be a complementary article, I.N. Dylevsky suggests that based on U.N. 
precedent in defining aggression, the Stuxnet, Estonian, and Georgian cyber attacks meet 
the spirit of the U.N. definition of aggression.178 The authors suggest that states may be 
dis-incentivized from cyber aggression if the U.N. modifies the Article 3 definition of 
aggression by including: 
• “use of information weapons by the armed forces of a state against the 
information resources of another state’s critically important facilities;” 
• “propaganda of war and use of force by a state and spreading seditious 
information, which helps destabilize the internal and international 
situation, unleash and escalate armed conflicts.”179 
The popular, academic, and military perspectives on informational-technological 
aspects of information warfare share several themes. The authors recognize cyber 
weapons’ offensive dominance and point to a cyber arms race. Their perceived primary 
culprit and apparent aggressor in this arms race is the United States. Although much of 
175 S.M. Boyko et al., “Potential Approaches to Implementing the Russian Federation's Military 
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Russian analysis acknowledges a cyber security dilemma and points out many of cyber 
weapons’ strategic and tactical characteristics, the proposed solutions seem divorced 
from these factors. Russians advocate for an international institutional solution, but do 
not explain how these mechanisms would mitigate the properties of cyber weapons that 
necessitate nations to establish offensive cyber units. This likely reflects a perception that 
Russia cannot compete in a cyber arms race and its vulnerability is so great that only 
international regimes can guarantee its security. Because international institutions are 
unlikely to address the challenge of weapon secrecy in cyberspace and covert acquisition, 
Russians likely hope that if other nations voluntarily halt their offensive cyber weapons 
programs in accordance with international agreements, Russian cyber development can 
secretly attain parity. 
B. OFFICIAL RUSSIAN VIEW OF CYBER POWER 
In addition to the discussion of cyber power by Russian academia, military, and 
media, the government of the Russian Federation has also mentioned the role of 
cyberspace in its national planning guidance and military doctrine. This official mention 
of cyber power gives insight into what Russian leaders believe are their nation's security 
challenges and priorities, and, importantly, it illustrates how the Russian government 
wishes others to perceive its posture on cyberspace issues.  
1. National Security Perspective 
At the foundation of the official Russian Federation’s view of cyber power is its 
Information Security Doctrine, published on September 9, 2000. The document is the 
“totality of official views, objectives, principles, and basic guidelines for ensuring 
information security of the Russian Federation” and is the basis for “shaping government 
policy” and “devising targeted national information security programs.”180 It lists four 
key areas of Russian national interest in the information sphere, threats and sources of 
threats to these national interests, and methods for ensuring information security. Though 
180 “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, last modified December 29, 2008, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b!OpenDocument. 
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much of the doctrine focuses on supporting Russia’s then fragile economy, civil society, 
and political system, the document also identifies potential information warfare threats 
from other states. Two such key sources of threat are detailed in Article 1, Section 3: 
• “activities of foreign political, economic, military, intelligence and 
information entities, directed against the interests of the Russian 
Federation in the information sphere;”  
• “development by a number of states of information war concepts that 
provide for creating means for dangerous attack on the information 
spheres of other countries of the world, disturbing the normal functioning 
of their information and telecommunication systems, breaching the 
security of their information resources and gaining unsanctioned access to 
them.”181 
These two sources of threats mirror Russian information warfare concepts of 
information-psychological and information-technological weapons, although, as Timothy 
Thomas points out, the terms themselves are not used.182 In addition to identifying 
threats and vulnerabilities, the Information Security Doctrine articulates various legal, 
organizational-technical, and economic approaches to combating these sources of threat. 
Finally, in summarizing the international system, the doctrine recognizes leading world 
powers’ efforts to develop information weapons, warns of an impending arms race, and 
emphasizes the need for an international approach for safeguarding Russia’s information 
space.183 
The tone of the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 
according to Keir Giles, is entirely defensive—there is no mention of offensive 
operations.184 Although the document appears to take a holistic approach to information 
security, it lists several concepts that differ from Western approaches to security. The 
most important divergence is an illiberal attitude toward the media. Regardless whether a 
media entity is private or state-owned, the doctrine states that it is acceptable and 
essential that the government ensures pro-Russian messaging. The Russian government 
181 “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation.” 
182 Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory, ” 275-6. 
183 “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation.” 
184 Giles, “’Information Troops,’” 47-8. 
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clarified that this position intended only to provide state oversight and not censorship, but 
Giles argues that historical evidence suggests the latter outcome.185 
Surprisingly, despite the depth of information security guidance in the 
Information Security Doctrine, the Russian Federation National Security Strategy 
Through 2020, approved on 12 May 2009, barely addresses this security area. This key 
official guidance and planning document for Russian security services, while describing 
in-depth a multitude of criminal, economic, and healthcare threats and security strategies, 
approaches information security challenges only indirectly. In describing the international 
environment, the strategy recognizes that global information confrontations exist and will 
escalate, and that illegal activity using cybernetic and other technological weapons will 
threaten Russian interests.186 Consequent strategic guidance, however, is sparse and 
vague: 
ensuring...the availability of information technologies and also 
information on the various issues of society’s sociopolitical, economic, 
and spiritual life… 
developing information and telecommunications technology, computer 
hardware, electronics, telecommunications equipment, and software 
industries… 
overcome the technological lag in the most important spheres of 
information science, telecommunications, and communications that 
determine the condition of national security...and also provide conditions 
for the harmonization of the national information infrastructure with 
global information networks and systems… 
threats to information security are to be prevented by improving the 
security of the functioning of the information and telecommunications 
systems of critically important infrastructure facilities...and by creating a 
single information-telecommunications support system for the needs of the 
national security system.187 
185 Giles, “‘Information Troops,’” 70-1. 
186 “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” Rustrans Useful Translations, last modified 
September 17, 2012, http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020. 
187 Ibid. 
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Though these tasks address threats to Russia’s cyber civil society, supply chain, and 
critical infrastructure, the National Security Strategy fails to address Russians’ perceived 
global information confrontation or the disruptive effect of cyber weapons. 
It is possible that this paucity of guidance reflects the Russian government’s lack 
of information security concerns in 2009, but considering the high degree of reflection on 
the information warfare campaign during the previous year’s Russo-Georgian conflict, 
this seems unlikely. Keir Giles offers one explanation—President Medvedev intended the 
document to focus on economics and to convey a positive, aspirational tone of a newly 
confident and cooperative Russia.188 Yet another possibility is that the Russian 
government restricted in-depth strategic consideration of information war to classified 
documents. Whatever the explanation, the lack of substantive discussion of information 
and cyber security in the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy Until 2020, 
especially relative to the more overt defensive posture described in the Information 
Security Doctrine, confounds a clear interpretation of Russia’s cyber posture.   
2. Military Doctrine 
Historically, Russia’s cyber capabilities were concentrated in the nation’s security 
services. The FSB maintains and operates SORM; Roskomnadzor controls information 
blacklists; and the MVD’s Directorate K focuses on information crime issues. The 
Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information was briefly tasked 
with information security, but the agency was disbanded in the 1990s and its capabilities 
redistributed among larger security organizations. In comparison to these agencies’ 
various level of cyber capability, the Russian military has only maintained an electronic 
warfare force.189 Following the criticism of the Russo-Georgian War, however, President 
Medvedev undertook military reform that included a directive to “develop forces and 
resources for information warfare.”190 
188 Keir Giles, Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020 (NATO Defense College, June 2009): 4-5, 
11, http://www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/rusnatsecstrategyto2020.pdf. 
189 Giles, “‘Information Troops,’” 51-3. 
190 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” The School of Russian and Asian Studies, last 
modified February 2, 2010, http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010. 
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The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved on 5 February 2010, 
responded to the national defense tasks in the Russian Federation’s National Security 
Strategy Through 2020 and codified President Medvedev and Defense Minister 
Serdykov’s reform initiatives. Because the document’s intent was to support reform 
measures, the doctrine focuses mainly on Russia’s efforts to transition from a mass-
mobilization Soviet-era military to a highly mobile permanently ready professional force. 
Nonetheless, it contains several interesting observations about the international system 
and the nature of modern warfare. 
The foremost assertion is that future military conflicts will include a cyber or 
informational component. According to the doctrine, the role of information warfare will 
intensify while new weapons systems “based on new physical principles” will be 
“comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of effectiveness.”191 Additionally, military 
conflicts will combine military and nonmilitary forces and resources—a possible 
reference to irregular combatants or surrogate forces such as the ones typical of Russian-
affiliated cyber attacks.192 During future conflicts, information warfare will be essential 
for pre-conflict shaping of the political space and for “shaping a favorable response from 
the world community to the utilization of military force.”193 Clearly, the information 
troops that the doctrine establishes will have a role in Russian military art. 
Whether this role will be offensive or defensive is not clear from the doctrine. The 
sections on external dangers and threat analysis only vaguely refer to information threats: 
efforts to destabilize states and regions on Russia’s periphery and interference in the 
internal affairs of the Russian Federation.194 Likewise, the doctrine does not outline any 
specific deterrence tasks or wartime tasks of a cyber or information warfare nature. At 
most, the doctrine describes the need for information systems support for its military 
modernization plans.195 It may be the case that such tasks and analysis may be too 




195 Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy, ”114-5.  
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ambitious for a doctrinal document that first seeks to establish information warfare 
troops. It is also possible that the Russian Federation does not consider these threats as 
sufficiently serious to define in doctrine. As with the National Security Strategy, the 
Russian Federation’s military doctrine takes an ambiguous position; though it recognizes 
the importance of information warfare to Russian security and in military conflicts in 
general, it does not describe the Russian approach to cyber warfare. 
Shortly after the release of the 2010 Military Doctrine, the Russian Ministry of 
Defense published the Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation in Information Space. Keir Giles describes the Conceptual Views 
as “a Russian military cyber proto-doctrine” and “the first explicit public statement of the 
Russian military’s role in cyberspace.”196 Though the document is a relatively succinct 
fifteen pages of terms and definitions, principles, rules, and confidence building 
measures, it provides new insight into the Russian military’s development in cyberspace 
doctrine. 
Like previous Russian literature about information operations and war, the 
Conceptual Views defines the operational terms from an information-centric perspective. 
It defines information war as actions that may damage information systems and 
resources; undermine political, economic, and social systems; brainwash the population; 
or coerce the victim government. The information space within which information war 
may take place is the “area of activity related to the formation, creation, transformation, 
transmission, use, and storage of information.”197 These definitions reflect a broader 
perspective than the U.S. definition, which considers cyberspace as a domain within the 
information environment.198 As defined in the Conceptual Views, the Russian concept of 
an information war is an amalgam of U.S. cyber operations and information operations 
doctrines. Unlike the American doctrine that categorizes cyber operations as offensive, 
196 Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance,” 67. 
197 “Conceptual Views,” 5. 
198 Joint Publication 3-12, “Cyberspace Operations,” (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), v, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. 
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defensive, or sustainment, however, the Conceptual Views only specifies defensive cyber 
operations.199 
In addition to outlining strictly defensive operations, the Conceptual Views also 
delineates a narrow scope of military responsibilities. It tasks the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation with solely their own information security. Although a secondary task 
of the Armed Forces is to provide broader information security, the military’s priority is 
on the defense of the Armed Forces—identifying threats and avoiding disorganization of 
command and control, disruption to military logistics, and demoralization of the 
military.200 The task of broader national defense against military-political information 
threats is less apparent. These implementation measures consist of interagency 
coordination, early threat detection, and international cooperation and norm-setting.201  
Though the Conceptual Views emphasize the centrality of international 
institutions for maintaining information security, it emphasizes the need for international 
norms, regulations, and non-military conflict resolution under the U.N. aegis, rather than 
through regional collective security arrangements. This focus, argues Giles, also 
distinguishes the Russian military’s approach to information warfare from the West’s.202 
As he points out, the Russian military’s task to promote international institutions is 
atypical for Western militaries. The reason for this focus may be that the Russian 
government genuinely considers its Armed Forces as champions of its non-military 
foreign policy initiatives, but the more likely explanation is that the Russian government 
lacks confidence in the Army’s ability to provide for its own information security. 
The latest iteration of Russian military doctrine on cyber operations may be the 
so-called Gerasimov doctrine. This unofficial doctrine, published in Voyenno-
Promyshlennyy Kuryer in 2013 by Russian Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Army-
General Valery Gerasimov, represents a potential future development of the Russian 
199 Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance,” 67-8. 
200 “Conceptual Views,” 7-10. 
201 Ibid., 8, 10-1. 
202 Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance,” 69. 
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military art.203 Giving credence to speculation that this article represents official views, 
Russian operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, called hybrid war or non-linear war 
by commentators, demonstrate many facets of Gerasimov’s ideas—the conflict in 
Ukraine consists of “simultaneously occurring guerrilla and conventional fighting, 
economic, cyber, and information war.”204 Unlike in Russia’s official military doctrine, 
cyber operations play an essential and prominent offensive role in the Gerasimov 
doctrine.  
The underlying postulate of the new doctrine, as Mark Galeotti highlights in his 
review of Gerasimov’s article, is that the rules of war have changed—non-military means 
may be more effective than conventional ones.205 This realization about 21st Century 
conflicts requires a new approach to war, and the main purpose of the article is a call for 
action for Russian military academics to address Gerasimov’s observations about the 
international system and the nature of warfare. His key points in relation to cyber and 
information warfare are: 
• Conflict increasingly consists of information and other non-military means 
• Covert actions and irregular forces are increasingly important in 
information confrontation 
• The distinctions between strategic, operational, and tactical levels and 
offensive and defensive operations are disappearing 
• Information weapons enable asymmetric operations that counteract 
adversary advantages and allow the formation of a resistance front 
throughout the entirety of enemy territory 
• Information confrontation creates opportunities to lower the adversary’s 
combat potential.206 
203 Roger McDermott, “Myth and Reality—A Net Assessment of Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Strategy 
Since the Start of 2014 (Part One),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 184 (October 17, 2014), 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42966&cHash=6807c1930e
ae4cbece171314536d557c#.VMwHucbn3GA. 
204 Margarita Šešelgytė, “Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern 
Europe?,” European Leadership Network, last modified October 17, 2014, 
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/can-hybrid-war-become-the-main-security-challenge-for-
eastern-europe_2025.html. 
205 Galeotti, “'Gerasimov Doctrine.’” 
206 Valery Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ Nauki v Vredvidenii [Value of Applied Science],” Voyenno-
Promyshlennyy Kuryer, last modified February 27, 2013, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. 
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The nature of modern conflict necessitates that information warfare spans all phases of 
conflict and includes military and non-military forces (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.  Role of Non-military Means for Resolving Interstate Conflicts 
According to the Gerasimov doctrine.207 
Gerasimov’s article, if it eventually translates into Russian military doctrine, 
establishes an aggressive, offensive cyber posture. Information activities against another 
state may begin ahead of overt political and military crises, and if executed according to 
doctrine, will employ means and methods that will be difficult to attribute to the military 
and to the Russian Federation. Disconcertingly, the doctrine does not discuss the use of 
207 Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ Nauki v Vredvidenii.” [The author's translations are in red font.] 
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information weapons for deterrence or de-escalation during the initial phases of 
conflicts—instead, information weapons will have only an offensive role.  
This doctrinal formulation of the role of information weapons is potentially highly 
disruptive to international security. By doctrinal implication, all pro-Russian activity in 
the information environment is potentially threatening to other states. A Russian 
company’s investment into another nation’s telecommunications infrastructure may be a 
covert Phase 1 attempt to gain access to critical infrastructure. Similarly, a DDoS attack 
or a website defacement of a particular political group may signal an attempt to influence 
political opinions or morale. A significant security problem stemming from the 
Gerasimov Doctrine is that countries that consider Russia as a potential security threat 
may now see neutral Russian actions or hostile non-Russian actions in cyberspace as 
covert hostile acts in preparation for a wider conflict. Although according to the realist 
worldview, states are naturally distrustful of other states, the Gerasimov Doctrine 
exacerbates mistrust toward Russia. 
C. INTERNATIONAL POSITION 
It is apparent from unofficial and official Russian information warfare discussion 
that international engagement in cyberspace is an essential element of their cyber 
posture—Timothy Thomas considers international efforts to be one prong of Russians’ 
strategic approach to security.208 These efforts at international engagement have not 
always been successful at creating international consensus, but they have outlined a clear 
vision for a potential Internet structure. More so, this Russian proposition for 
international cyber norms is already being implemented through regional Eurasian blocs: 
Russia’s vision for information security is not just rhetorical. 
1. United Nations  
The Russian Federation’s substantive efforts to shape the international cyber 
discussion began in 1998, with Russia’s modest proposal at the United Nations General 
Assembly’s Fifty-third session to solicit information security views and assessments from 
208 Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory, ” 267-8. 
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member states. Specifically, Resolution 53/70, “Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” called on 
U.N. members to promote international consideration of information threats and invited 
members to provide their views on information security in general, on definitions, and on 
the advisability of developing international principles to address information terrorism 
and criminality.209 Though it recognized information technology’s potential military 
applications, the resolution did not address information security as a military issue, 
however. 
The resolution achieved its intent of opening an international dialogue on 
information security. For example, in the 2010 “Report of the Secretary General,” in 
response to A/RES/53/70, Cuba took the opportunity to express its concerns with “radio-
electric aggression against Cuba from United States,” accusing the United States of 
violating Cuba’s sovereignty through provocative and subversive radio and television 
broadcasts.210 A similar report from Georgia in A/RES/69/112 voiced the state’s 
concerns about the use of cyber weapons during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict.211 
This forum has also allowed NATO and OSCE member states to articulate their 
perspectives on international information security strategies.  
More importantly, Russia’s 1998 resolution also initiated a parallel U.N. process 
for studying cyber threats. Again thanks to Moscow’s advocacy, the U.N. assembled a 
fifteen-member Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with a mission to evaluate cyber 
threats and to propose cooperative solutions. The Group’s first effort in 2004 failed; 
according to the GGE’s report to the Secretary-General, “given the complexity of the 
issues involved, no consensus was reached on the preparation of the final report.”212 The 
main stumbling block, according to a member of the Russian delegation, was the 
209 Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, A/RES/53/70, United Nations, 53rd sess. (1999). 
210 Report of the Secretary-General, A/RES/65/154, United Nations, 65th sess. (2010): 2-5. 
211 Report of the Secretary-General, A/RES/69/112, United Nations, 69th sess. (2014): 9-10. 
212 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/60/202, United Nations, 60th sess.(2005): 
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applicability of international humanitarian law.213 The U.N. Office for Disarmament 
Affairs clarifies the issues faced by the first GGE: 
The first issue was the question of the impact of developments in 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) on national security 
and military affairs. While there was general agreement regarding the 
importance of such developments, consensus could not be found on the 
amount of emphasis to be placed on this concern, and whether or not to 
include language that stressed the new threats posed by State exploitation 
of ICTs for military and national security purposes.  
The second issue was the question of whether the discussion should 
address issues of information content or should focus only on information 
infrastructures. There was particular disagreement regarding the claim that 
trans-border information content should be controlled as a matter of 
national security.214 
In short, the GGE was divided on whether information security considered only hostile 
code or also recognized hostile content. 
Despite the initial impasse, the GGE succeeded in publishing its first report in 
November 2005. Of the 164 nations voting, the United States was the sole country to vote 
against the draft information security resolution in that report.215 The cause of the 
resolution’s contentiousness was the U.S. concern that information technologies “may 
adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their 
security in both civil and military fields.”216 What the United States considered implicit 
in the resolution was an attempt to establish the groundwork for measures that would 
allow states to restrict perceived malicious information flow across state boundaries. The 
United States also stated that the Russian proposal failed to focus on cybercrime and 
213 Tim Maurer, “Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations—An Analysis of the UN's Activities 
Regarding Cyber-security, ” Discussion Paper 2011-12, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, (September 2011): 22. 
214 “Fact Sheet: Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security,” U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, last modified June 2013, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/factsheet/iob/Information_Security_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
215 Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, A/60/452, United Nations, 60th sess. (2005): 2. 
216 Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications, 3. 
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unnecessarily emphasized military concerns, which the United States considered to be 
already addressed under existing international humanitarian law.217 
The 2005 resolution included provisions for subsequent GGEs, which produced 
reports in 2009 and 2013. The second and third GGE’s reports and resolutions have 
advanced the discussion on information security. The 2013 report, A/68/98, recognized 
the dual-use nature of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) as either 
legitimate or malicious, the security challenge posed by global interconnectedness and 
anonymity, and the hostile potential of state and non-state actors. It also emphasized 
responsible state behavior, particularly state sovereignty and jurisdiction over ICT 
infrastructure, as well as states’ responsibilities for proxies and operation of non-State 
actors within national jurisdiction.218 This formulation seems to be a Russian concession 
to accusations of its permissive attitude toward the pro-Russian cyber attacks against 
Estonia and Georgia; by condemning and disavowing as illegitimate the sort of hostile 
acts that were previously associated with Russia, Russia’s diplomats have in return 
gained acceptance of broader definitions of threats and inserted references to domestic 
cyber sovereignty and hostile content. The potential significance of the current stage of 
U.N. discussion might, therefore, be a mutual recognition of subjective cyber threats 
perceived by the Western and Russian governments.    
Perhaps just as important as its success in shaping the cyber terminology via U.N. 
resolutions, Russia has managed to increase international support for its initiatives and 
perspective. Through 2005, Russia was the sole sponsor of its resolutions on information 
security. From 2006 to 2009, Russia attracted 29 cosponsors, including the People’s 
Republic of China. In 2010, The United States also joined as a co-sponsor—a notable 
change of position for a state that had voted against the resolutions from 2005–2008 (the 
United States neither co-sponsored nor vetoed the resolution in 2013).219 This trend, 
217 Developments in the field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, Addendum, A/59/116/Add.1, United Nations, 59th sess. (2004): 3-4. 
218 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/68/98, United Nations, 68th sess. (2013): 
6-7. 
219 Maurer, “Cyber Norm Emergence,” 26-7. 
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however, does not necessarily imply that the Russian position has shifted closer to the 
U.S.’s. Among the 43 cosponsors of the 2013 Resolution were Belarus, China, Cuba, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic, Sierra 
Leone, Turkmenistan, and the Sudan—not a single E.U. member state cosponsored it.220 
It appears that Russian advocacy of cyber norms favoring its cyber threat perception is 
gaining increasing support in the U.N.; the Russian Federation’s vision of an international 
information security regime seems to have attracted a following of like-minded states.  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the core of the international 
bloc through which the Russian Federation is attempting to influence the global 
international system. Following Russia’s successful sponsorship in 2005 of A/RES/60/45, 
“Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security,” the heads of SCO member states released a statement on 
information security, endorsing the U.N.’s approach. Several Russian information 
security concerns are evident in the statement: ICT threats to internal affairs of sovereign 
states, military and political ICT uses that threaten international stability, and the ongoing 
use of ICTs by some countries that adversely affect the whole world.221 Unlike the U.N. 
resolutions’ wording that leaves room for multiple interpretations, Russia’s position 
expressed via the SCO is unambiguous: Russia believes that the United States is using 
information weapons, or hostile content, to destabilize other states, interfering in their 
internal affairs. 
In 2011, four members of the SCO, China; Russia; Tajikistan; and Uzbekistan, 
appealed to the U.N. for an International Code of Conduct for information security. 
Though the preamble to the Code of Conduct echoed the wording of U.N. resolutions, its 
recommendations more closely resembled SCO statement on information security. 
Foremost in the Code of Conduct is a pledge to neither carry out hostile acts nor 
220 Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, A/68/406, United Nations, 68th sess. (2013): 2. 
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proliferate information weapons. The Code of Conduct pledge repeatedly stresses mutual 
respect of state sovereignty—states may defend their information space against various 
threats according to their own definitions of such threats, and according to their own 
definitions of rights and freedoms in the information space. In addition, states that accept 
the Code of Conduct must also cooperate with other states in “curbing the dissemination 
of information that...undermines other countries’ political, economic, and social 
stability.”222 Russia’s proposed Code of Conduct not only codifies content as hostile, but 
also obligates other states to assist Russia in removing hostile content, even within their 
own cyberspace. 
Though Russian efforts at the United Nations have not resulted in a 
predominantly pro-Russian international consensus, they are indicative of Russia’s 
posture and intentions. The Russian Federation continues to work toward an international 
framework that establishes cyber assurances and reduces the cyber arms race as Russia 
sees that race to be unfolding. Its defensive tone is slowly gaining international 
acceptance and support as other illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes that share 
Russian security concerns align themselves with Russia’s position. 
2. Draft Convention on International Information Security  
Within ten days of proposing the Code of Conduct to the U.N., Russia presented a 
conceptual Convention on International Information Security at the 2nd International 
Meeting of High-Ranking Officials Responsible for Security Matters—an effort to shape 
international discourse concurrently with similar U.N. efforts. This document is a lucid 
articulation of Russian perceptions of information threats, and Russia’s international 
agenda. Keir Giles succinctly summarizes the draft Convention: the Russian vision of 
Internet governance espouses “important caveats on the flow of information and an 
insistence on national sovereignty in cyberspace.”223 
222 Letter Dated 12 September 2011 From the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian 
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From the outset, Russia proposes a trade-off between freedom of information flow 
and openness, in Article 1, Subject and Aim of the Convention. The Convention defines 
the rights of government in the information spaces as “compatible with the right of each 
individual to seek, receive, and distribute information and ideas, as is affirmed in UN 
documents, while keeping in mind that this right may be restricted through legislation to 
protect the national and social security of each State” and “guaranteeing the free 
exchange of technology and information, while maintaining respect for the sovereignty of 
States.”224 In order to promote international peace and security, including non-
interference in domestic issues, the Convention proposes a version of the Internet subject 
to the domestic politics of participating states. 
These aims follow from Russia’s definition of information threats to international 
security. Of the eleven stated threats, three derive from the Russian understanding of the 
information-psychological aspect of information warfare: 
4) actions in the information space aimed at undermining the political, 
economic, and social system of another government, and psychological 
campaigns carried out against the population of a State with the intent of 
destabilizing society… 
6) the dissemination of information across national borders, in a manner 
counter to the principles and norms of international law, as well as the 
national legislation of the government involved… 
8) the manipulation of the flow of information in the information space of 
other governments, disinformation or the concealment of information with 
the goal of adversely affecting the psychological or spiritual state of 
society, or eroding traditional cultural, moral, ethical, and aesthetic 
values225 
These threats are also captured in the Convention’s definition of information warfare, 
which, in addition to information-technical attacks, includes psychological campaigns 
intended to destabilize society and government. 
In its principles for ensuring international information security, the Convention 
reiterates the observance of non-use of force, illegality of information warfare, non-
224 “Convention on International Information Security.” 
225 Ibid. 
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interference in foreign information spaces, necessity for balancing human rights and 
information security, and primacy of national sovereignty with respect to Internet 
governance. It also introduces appeals to the notion of indivisibility of security, 
prohibiting states from strengthening “their security at the expense of the security of 
other states.”226 This appeal, as Keir Giles argues, is based on loaded term that masks 
different understandings of “indivisibility of security” by Russia and the West.227 What 
the Convention implies behind the concept is unclear, but based on the subsequent 
principle addressing the need for bridging a digital divide among various states, Russia 
may be alluding to U.S. investment in military cyber forces. If so, the Convention echoes 
Jervis's definition of the security dilemma; a situation in which purely defensive 
investments increase the insecurity of other states. For this to occur, however, postures 
must be indistinguishable as offensive or defensive. Therefore, Russia's claim that other 
states' information security investments violate the principle of indivisibility of security 
implies that Russians view the international environment as one in which cyber postures 
cannot be easily distinguished. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the draft Convention propose measures for averting 
military conflict, preventing terrorist use, and counteracting illegal activities. Among 
these proposed measures several stand out. To prevent military conflict, states adopting 
the Convention, must agree not only to refrain from undertaking or threatening with 
hostile actions, but must also “refrain from developing and adopting plans or doctrines 
capable of increasing threats...straining relations.”228 States must also take measures to 
prevent “untruthful or distorted messages” originating within their own information space 
that other states might consider hostile.229 Effectively, the Convention seeks not just a 
freeze on military development in cyberspace, but mandates that states take action to 
assuage the security concerns of other states, according to those states’ threat perceptions. 
This framework for international security extends the responsibility for states to respond 
226 “Convention on International Information Security.” 
227 Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance,” 65.  
228 “Convention on International Information Security.” 
229 Ibid. 
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to the actions of domestic non-state actors, upon the request of aggrieved states, 
suggesting that not all states have the domestic capacity to defend themselves. 
Though Russia has not advocated for this conceptual convention to be proposed at 
the United Nations, it has presented an alternative to Western approaches, particularly to 
the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime that Russia has not signed.230 The 
Convention articulates a vision for the Internet that may appeal to states that are not able 
to safeguard their information space. Its emphasis on military restrictions along with 
criminal countermeasures likely reflects its own insecurity and defensive orientation. 
Russia appears willing to cooperate internationally, preventing events like the 2007 
Estonia cyber attacks or curbing its cybercriminal underground, to gain broader security 
guarantees and to halt the development of America’s military cyber power. This may 
imply that Russia places more strategic value on defending against its perceived global 
information threat than on the offensive capability used during the Estonia attacks. 
D. HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The dominant theme throughout Russian scholarly discourse, official documents, 
military doctrine, and international efforts is that Russia feels vulnerable in cyberspace 
relative to other great powers, and takes a defensive posture on cyberspace issues.231 
Cyber power, according to David Betz and Tim Stevens, can be subdivided as 
compulsory, institutional, structural, or productive.232 The Russian position seems to 
recognize a capability gap in its compulsory, structural, and productive cyber power; 
consequently, Russia appears to focus its efforts on developing and exercising its 
institutional cyber power. The intent of these efforts is either to eliminate Russia’s cyber 
vulnerabilities through an international prohibition on the types of weapons that they 
perceive as threatening, or to buy time to develop its own offensive capability by stalling 
leading cyber powers. This interpretation supports H3. Russia’s cyber capability is 
230 Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance,” 66-67.  
231 [This analysis assumes that Russian sources genuinely convey Russian security concerns, and that 
they are not deliberately misleading. Because Russia places high value on information operations, this may 
be an incorrect assumption, but the author did not find sources that suggest a misinformation campaign.] 
232 David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, “Chapter One: Power and Cyberspace,” Adelphi Series 51, no. 424 
(2011): 42-53. doi: 10.1080/19445571.2011.636954. 
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offensive and the posture is distinguishable as either offensive or defensive and H4. 
Russia’s cyber capability is defensive and the posture is distinguishable as either 
offensive or defensive. There are several nuances to Russia’s position that potentially 
weaken this interpretation, however. 
First, because the Russian concept of cyber capability is inextricably linked to the 
notion of information confrontation, its posture reflects Russia’s unique understanding of 
the international system. That is, Russia’s defensive posture reflects a different set of 
threats and a different understanding of a security dilemma. The West’s understanding of 
the cyber security dilemma does not consider, for example, non-governmental 
organizations that promote democratic reforms as a potential means of hostile 
confrontation—Russia’s understanding does. Because of this divergent understanding, 
Russia sees its own vulnerabilities and hostile enemy capabilities where others might not. 
Thus, in considering Russia’s posture and intentions, it is important to recognize that if its 
state-level intentions or posture seems inconsistent with an international-level 
understanding of the security dilemma, this may be the consequence not of Russian 
deliberate misalignment or misunderstanding or the international system, but instead the 
result of a fundamentally different understanding of cyber power. 
Another confounding factor is the longitudinal aspect of this chapter’s analysis—
Russia’s posture has changed over time. Though the documents differ in scope and focus, 
the shallow consideration of information security issues in the Russian Federation 
National Security Strategy Through 2020 may suggest that Russian insecurity is 
decreasing relative to the security assessment at the publication of the Information 
Security Doctrine. At the very least, the sparse references to information security in 
National Security Strategy make assessment of Russia’s posture more difficult than the 
clearly expressed concerns of the much earlier Information Security Doctrine. This 
Chapter’s cross-sectional methodology that also considered international efforts and 
scholarly opinions may mitigate some of these concerns, however. The contemporaneous 
stance of Russian scholars and military officers, as well as Russian international efforts, 
compensate for the National Security Strategy’s ambiguity.  
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Developments in the Russian military doctrine also complicate posture analysis. 
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation appears to be defensive, but vague; the 
Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation in Information Space was defensively-minded; and the Gerasimov doctrine 
appears highly aggressive. This apparent contradiction of doctrinal views reduces the 
level of certainty in Russia’s cyber posture. It may be possible to reconcile these 
contradictory views somewhat. Russia’s defensive posture seems oriented toward 
Russia’s perceived global information confrontation with America. Russia’s offensive 
posture, on the other hand, is oriented toward its near abroad. Depending on the relative 
balance of cyber power, Russia acts defensively or aggressively. Alternatively, it may be 
the case that Russia’s aggression on its periphery stems from its defensive insecurity. As 
John Mearsheimer argues more broadly about the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s aggressive 
actions toward its neighbors may be seen as a defensive a reaction to encroachment on a 
great power’s periphery.233 
In summary, this chapter evaluated whether Russia’s cyber posture is 
distinguishable—Robert Jervis’s second critical variable that determines the security 
dilemma. The author’s conclusion based on Russian public and official sources suggests 
that the posture is most accurately distinguished as defensive. Like Russia’s changing 
cyber weapons investments, this posture is also dynamic. In addition to the inherent 
difficulty in ascertaining whether the publically-perceived posture genuinely reflects the 
Russian government’s actual intentions, inconsistencies among Russian sources might 
suggest that the Russian cyber posture is changing. Nonetheless, the preponderance of 
evidence points to a predominantly defensive posture. 
 
233 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 
(September 2014): 77-89. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 1, 2015). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This final chapter uses the evidence, findings, and warrants from the previous 
evidentiary chapters that evaluated Russia’s cyber power according to Robert Jervis’s 
offense-defense variables. The first section determines the dominant hypothesis that 
answers the author’s research question: what are Russia’s capabilities and intentions in 
cyberspace? Based on the dominant hypothesis, the following section addresses the 
study’s implications and significance for both the international relations understanding of 
Russian cyber power and the efficacy of using offense-defense theory to study this issue. 
The final section of the chapter acknowledges the limitations of this study and proposes 
topics for subsequent research. 
A. HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
Chapters II and III ascertained that Russia’s cyber capability is offensive and that 
its posture is distinguishable, specifically that it is defensive. These conclusions support 
hypothesis three: 
H3. Russia’s cyber capability is offensive and the posture is distinguishable as 
either offensive or defensive. 
According to Robert Jervis’s Four Worlds model, an international system that reflects 
this hypothesis does not inherently lead to a security dilemma, but it does allow for 
circumstances under which revisionist or even status-quo states might war.234 If the 
postures of all major states were like Russia’s, according to Jervis, “states will have to 
watch each other carefully, and there is room for false suspicions”; it is a world in which 
stability depends on early warnings.235 In cyberspace, surveillance and detection of 
aggressive intentions is especially difficult; and Russia’s bellicose behavior, aggressive 
Gerasimov doctrine, and overt efforts at manipulating international perceptions suggest 
that other states should be especially wary of the Russian Federation. 
234 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 213-4. 
235 Ibid., 213. 
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Recent Russian efforts seek to harden its cyber terrain as well as improving 
domestic Internet governance, perhaps signaling that it is attempting to dampen security 
dilemma pressures. This may not necessarily be the case, however, since even defensive 
investments might make other states feel more insecure. For example, Russian 
restrictions on anonymous domestic Internet use may limit Russia’s own offensive 
capability since it will be more difficult to conduct unattributed attacks from within 
Russia’s cyber terrain, but such changes also increase the cost for others to conduct 
attacks on Russian targets. Similarly, although Russian law enforcement authorities 
dismantled the Russian Business Network cybercrime organization, a sophisticated and 
decentralized cyber underground has emerged in its place. Russian investments in 
domestically focused firewalls, content filters, and SORM devices appear to defend 
against domestic hostile content, but the underlying technology can be reoriented 
externally as well. Russia’s goal appears to be to create a fractured Internet and to have 
the ability to exert control over the content and logic within its cyberspace. The following 
section outlines some possible consequences of a “fractured Internet.” 
 Although Russian documents cite purely defensive security concerns for these 
developments, they may in reality be a defensive buildup to deny preemptive or counter 
attacks. It may be more likely that Russia is on a trajectory that would move it closer to 
Jervis’s unstable first world case; a world in which offense dominates, and the posture is 
indistinguishable as offensive or defensive. Specifically, Russia has muddled the degree 
to which states can clearly distinguish its posture as defensive. Whereas Russian 
academic and military discussions of cyber power increasingly discuss its offensive 
applications as both hostile code and content, Russian official doctrine and government 
policy makes less mention of cyber security considerations. This may suggest a shift in 
Russian posture toward a more aggressive and secretive stance; the Gerasimov Doctrine 
may have provided an unofficial insight into this new, more aggressive view on 
employing cyber power. As with Russia’s initiatives to harden its cyber terrain, this 
change in posture similarly increases uncertainty about Russia’s intentions; this increased 
uncertainty and reliance on perceptions is likely to increase security dilemma pressures 
on the international system, or at least among Russia’s neighbors. 
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Additionally, although this paper applied Jervis’s offense-defense theory at the 
state level, the resulting hypothesis should also be interpreted in the context of the 
international system. Russia’s security concerns appear to be based on perceived 
vulnerability relative to the aggressive behavior of other great powers—responding to 
their content-as-a-weapon offensive intended to destabilize Russia’s domestic 
environment, according to Russian leaders. Despite this publically-articulated security 
concern, Russians, or pro-Russian proxies, have also used its offensive cyber capabilities 
against their neighbors. Russia’s capabilities, perceptions, and posture in cyberspace, 
therefore, differ depending on one’s perspective; it acts defensively relative to other great 
powers, but offensively as a would-be regional hegemon.  
Although this net assessment appears nuanced, it fits a theoretical pattern that 
Stephen van Evera hypothesized as a consequence of the offense-defense theory 
paradigm for the causes of war. He described ten explanations for why some states may 
choose to go to war in a world in which offense dominates, and two of these 
complimentary hypotheses appear to match Russia’s behavior: defensive expansionism 
and fierce resistance to expansion.236 According to van Evera, when conquest is easy, 
states compete more aggressively for resources on their periphery, creating buffer zones, 
expanding their own resources, and, importantly, preempting adversaries’ expansion into 
the same space.237 Applying this concept to the cyber domain, using the Russian concept 
of both hostile code and hostile content, Russian cyber aggression towards its neighbors 
is an attempt to preempt or thwart what current Russian leaders perceive—evidenced 
according to them by color revolutions and the Arab Spring—as adversarial expansion by 
hostile powers into the same information space. Russia's global defensive posture, but 
local aggressiveness, therefore, suggests that Russia’s role in cyberspace may be 
categorized as motivated by defensive expansion. 
Finally, the author anticipated that a potential research outcome could be an 
inapplicability of offense-defense theory to the subject of Russian cyber capability—
hypothesis five. With modifications to suit a state-level analysis and the distinctive 
236 van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” 7. 
237 Ibid., 7-9 
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properties of cyber power, this theoretical framework appears applicable and effective. 
More so, because the offense-defense paradigm assessment of Russian behavior comports 
with Stephen van Evera’s theoretical pattern of state behavior, this approach also 
demonstrates internal theoretical consistency and parsimony for applying Robert Jervis’s 
offense-defense theory to the study of cyber power. 
B.  LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The secrecy necessary to develop and preserve sophisticated cyber weapons and 
to establish and maintain persistent access to potential adversaries’ cyber assets, as well 
as the difficulty in attributing offensive cyber operations, complicate cyber capability 
assessments. In the relatively short history of cyber conflict many of the key international 
cyber events have been associated with Russia, and this study benefits from having a 
historical record of what might otherwise be a silent arms race.238 Despite the public 
knowledge and scholarly examination of Russia-affiliated cyber events, the evidence still 
presents analytic challenges. Most importantly, the challenge of positive attribution and 
the difficulty in assessing the degree of control that the Russian government has over its 
proxy cyber actors means that it is possible that the author incorrectly attributed these 
capabilities. Similarly, the secrecy of high-end Russian cyber weapons requires relying 
on other states' speculations about such capabilities. Official Russian documents also 
demand skepticism; it is almost certain that Russian doctrine and strategy in cyberspace 
is more thoroughly addressed in classified forums. These challenges are not as troubling 
as they appear, however. Russian-affiliated cyber attacks have typically relied on low-
sophistication cyber weapons that were widely known and available; Russia’s main cyber 
capability is not secret. States that perceive Russia as a cyber threat may, therefore, 
protect against most of Russian offensive cyber capability by investing in defenses 
against known vulnerabilities and exploits. 
A merit of offense-defense theory is that it can incorporate and reflect the 
weapons capability uncertainty stemming from secrecy and attribution difficulties; the 
theory's virtue is that its variables fundamentally acknowledge states' perceptions and 
238 Huntley, “Offense, Defense, and Cyber War,” 5. 
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partial information. Unfortunately, because perceptions, according to realist international 
relations theory, tend to reflect pessimistic expectations about others’ intentions, states’ 
assessments of an international system that relies on perceptions more than on facts, may 
lead to suboptimal foreign policy decisions and create more volatility than the actual 
situation warrants.  
Another challenge is reconciling Russia's state-level assessment with the 
international-level view of the cyberspace security dilemma; Russia's understanding of 
cyber power that includes hostile content differs from the Western definition that does 
not. This difference in definitions complicates the understanding of the forces underlying 
the security dilemma. In describing the international environment, Jervis describes states’ 
security demands as subjective; the vulnerability that states feel is situationally 
subjective.239 Russia’s feeling of insecurity in cyberspace is an extreme case of this 
phenomenon. Their belief that content can be hostile leads Russian leaders to feel 
threatened in situations in which other states might not perceive, or feel responsible for 
causing, a security threat. Aside from emphasizing offense-defense theory’s 
acknowledgement of the subjectivity of security perceptions, the author does not see an 
elegant solution for reconciling security perceptions in an international system in which 
two different sets of states categorize different types of cyber operations as security 
threats. Additional research may resolve this challenge by comparatively examining U.S. 
doctrine for cyber-enabled information and psychological operations and the Russian 
doctrine for information warfare.  
Finally, the author does not strive to recommend or comment on specific U.S. 
cyber policy, but instead proposes an offense-defense theory interpretation of divergent 
Western and Shanghai Cooperation Organization approaches to international Internet 
governance. The SCO bloc of countries consistently proposes internationally, and 
implements domestically, a policy that may lead to a fractured Internet, or at least a more 
nationalized implementation of their cyber terrain. This impulse appears to stem from 
these states’ concerns that the open, indefensible current structure of the Internet presents 
239 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ” 174-6. 
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a security threat, due mainly to their perception that hostile content may destabilize their 
autocratic regimes. The U.S. and European Union bloc of countries, in contrast, 
recognize a threat based on malicious logic, but not content.  
Russian emphasis on increasing cyber terrain defensiveness only reflects Russia’s 
investment choices. The difference in Russian and Western perspectives of the cyber 
threat, and the resulting divergent defensive approaches, exacerbate the offense-
dominance security dilemma pressures in cyberspace. However, further study is 
necessary to ascertain if a fractured Internet would fundamentally change the offense 
dominance of cyber weapons at the international level. For example, a potential approach 
to decreasing security dilemma pressures may be to support, or at least tolerate, a 
fracturing of cyberspace. If states divide the Internet into national zones, new defensive 
Internet terrain features will emerge—a fractured Internet will be an Internet that raises 
the cost of aggression for all parties, reducing the security dilemma. Alternately, if 
Western bloc countries perceive themselves as the current and future victors of a cyber 
arms race, then it may instead be in their interest to uphold an open Internet structure that 
gives them a position of greater relative power, denying others an Internet re-architecture 
that would make them relatively less weak.  
As Kenneth N. Waltz eloquently summarizes the value of realist international 
relations theory in Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, “Each state pursues 
its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best… a foreign policy based on [the 
international system level of analysis] of international relations is neither moral nor 
immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us.”240 This study 
concludes that Robert Jervis’s offense-defense theory is an excellent tool for conducting 
this reasoned, dispassionate analysis to better understand state behavior in cyberspace and 
to craft foreign policy accordingly. 
240 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University, 1969), 238. [Waltz’s original text is “A foreign policy based on this image of international 
relations.” The image that he references is his proposed third image of analysis—the anarchic international 
system.] 
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APPENDIX.  ADDITIONAL ANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS 
This appendix presents additional research findings amplifying, corroborating, 
and refuting, as appropriate and applicable, the open source material referenced in this 
thesis. The appendix is classified TOP SECRET. To obtain a copy of this classified 
appendix, please contact the Naval Postgraduate School’s Dudley Knox Library.
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